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PLANNING FOR PARTNERSHIP LIABILITY ALLOCATIONS, 
INCLUDING THE NEW PROPOSED REGULATIONS 
By 
Blake D. Rubin, Andrea M. Whiteway and Jon G. Finkelstein2 
McDermott Will & Eme1y LLP, Washington, D.C. 
January 2014 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The allocation of partnership liabilities can be critical to effectuating the tax 
planning goals of a partner. 
B. A partner's basis in a partnership interest generally includes the partner's 
allocable share of partnership liabilities. A partner's basis in the partnership 
interest is of great importance for two principal reasons. 
C. First, a partner recognizes gain upon a distribution of cash from a partnership only 
to the extent the distribution exceeds the partner's basis in the partnership interest. 
Section 731(a)(1).3 On the other side of the coin, a partner may receive 
distributions of cash up to the amount of the pminer' s basis in the partnership 
interest without recognizing taxable gain. 
D. Second, a partner may deduct losses of the partnership only to the extent of the 
partner's basis in the partnership interest. Section 704(d). 
E. Accordingly, a partner's allocation of partnership liabilities is important in 
determining the extent to which the partner can receive tax-free distributions of 
cash and deduct losses of the pminership. 
F. In addition, a decrease in a partner's share ofliabilities causes the partner to 
recognize taxable gain to the extent such decrease exceeds the partner's basis in 
the partnership. Section 752(b); Section 731(a). Such a deemed cash distribution 
could occur, for example, if a partnership reduces a liability, or if another partner 
guarantees a partnership liability. Thus, it is impmiant for a partner to know how 
partnership liabilities are allocated for Federal income tax purposes and how to 
achieve an allocation that is beneficial to that partner. 
2 Copyright 2014 Blake D. Rubin, Andrea M. Whiteway and Jon G. Finkelstein. All rights 
reserved. 
3 Unless otherwise noted or clear from context, section references are to the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. 
G. Part II of this outline summarizes the mles for allocating partnership liabilities for 
Federal income tax purposes under the existing section 752 regulations and 
contains a series of examples that illustrate techniques for managing the allocation 
of patinership liabilities under these mles. In addition, this section explains how 
these mles and techniques apply to limited liability companies ("LLC") that are 
treated as partnerships for Federal income tax purposes. 
H. Part III of this outline summarizes and analyzes the proposed patinership liability 
regulations under section 752 that were issued on January 29, 2014. As noted 
below, the proposed regulations would significantly change the way partnership 
liabilities are allocated to partners and would, in many cases, trigger gain to 
partners that have negative tax basis capital accounts or limit the ability of 
partners to take losses into account. 
II. PLANNING UNDER THE EXISTING PARTNERSHIP LIABILITY 
ALLOCATION RULES 
A. ALLOCATION OF PARTNERSHIP LIABILITIES: GENERAL RULES 
1. Increase in Share ofLiabilities 
a. Under section 752(a), any increase in a partner's share of liabilities 
of a partnership, or any increase in a partner's individual liabilities 
by reason of the assumption by such partner of partnership 
liabilities, is treated as a contribution of money by such partner to 
the partnership. 
b. Under section 722, this deemed contribution of money by the 
partner to the partnership increases the partner's basis in the 
partnership interest. 
2. Decrease in Share ofLiabilities 
a. Under section 752(b), any decrease in a partner's share of the 
liabilities of a partnership, or any decrease in a patiner's individual 
liabilities by reason of the assumption by the partnership of such 
individual liabilities, is treated as a distribution of money to the 
partner by the partnership. Under sections 733(1) and 705(a)(2), 
this deemed distribution of money by the partnership to the partner 
reduces the partner's basis in the partnership interest, but not 
below zero. 
4 An LLC is taxable as a partnership for Federal income tax purposes unless it elects to be 
taxed as a corporation under the "check-the-box" regulations. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(l). 
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b. Under section 731(a), upon a distribution of money to a partner by 
a partnership (including a deemed distribution of money pursuant 
to Section 752(b)), gain is recognized by the distributee partner to 
the extent that the money distributed exceeds the adjusted basis of 
the partner's interest immediately before the distribution. 
3. Increases and Decreases in Single Transaction 
a. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(f) provides that if, as a result of a single 
transaction, a partner incurs both an increase in the partner's share 
of partnership liabilities (or the partner's individual liabilities) and 
a decrease in the partner's share of partnership liabilities (or the 
partner's individual liabilities), only the net decrease is treated as a 
distribution of money and only the net increase is treated as a 
contribution of money. 
4. Definition of"Liability" for Purposes of Section 752 
a. Section 752 does not define the term "liability." Until2005, the 
regulations under section 752 likewise did not define the term. 
b. In Rev. Rul. 88-77, 1988-2 CB 128, the Internal Revenue Service 
(the "Service") held that, for purposes of section 752, the terms 
"liabilities of a partnership" and "partnership liabilities" include an 
obligation only if and to the extent that incurring the liability 
creates or increases the basis to the partnership of any of the 
partnership's assets (including cash attributable to borrowings), 
gives rise to an immediate deduction to the partnership, or, under 
section 705(a)(2)(B), currently decreases a partner's basis in the 
partner's partnership interest. 
c. Based on this analysis, the Service concluded that accrued but 
unpaid expenses and accounts payable are not liabilities within the 
meaning of section 752 for purposes of computing the adjusted 
basis of a partner's interest in a partnership using the cash method 
of accounting. 
d. In Rev. Rul. 95-26, 1995-1 CB 131, the Service held that a short 
sale of securities creates a partnership liability for purposes of 
section 752 because the short sale creates an obligation to deliver 
the securities while the cash proceeds from the sale increase the 
basis of the partnership's assets. See also Salina Partnership v. 
Commissioner, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 686 (2000). 
e. 2005 Regulations. In 2005, as part of the amendments to the 
section 752 regulations addressing non-tax basis liabilities 
discussed in Part IV hereof, Treas. Reg. 1.752-1 was amended to 
provide a definition of "liability" for purposes of section 752. 
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Treas. Reg. 1.752-l(a)(4) now provides that an obligation is a 
liability if and to the extent that incuning the obligation --
1. creates or increases the basis of any ofthe obligor's assets 
(including cash); 
ii. gives rise to an immediate deduction to the obligor; or 
111. gives rise to an expense that is not deductible in computing 
the obligor's taxable income and is not properly chargeable 
to capital. 
£ An "obligation" is any fixed or contingent obligation to make 
payment without regard to whether the obligation is otherwise 
taken into account for purposes of the Code. Obligations include, 
but are not limited to, debt obligations, environmental obligations, 
tort obligations, contract obligations, pension obligations, 
obligations under a short sale, and obligations under derivative 
financial instruments such as options, fmward contracts, and 
futures contracts. Thus, an "obligation" the incunence of which 
creates or increases basis, give rise to an immediate deduction or 
gives rise to a non-deductible, non-capitalizable expense is treated 
as a liability. 
5. Recourse Liabilities and Nomecourse Liabilities 
a. Partnership liabilities are classified as either recourse or 
nomecourse, and this classification determines the allocation rules 
that apply. 
b. If one or more partners bears the "economic risk ofloss" (see 
below) with respect to part, but not all, of a partnership liability 
represented by a single contractual obligation, that liability is 
treated as two or more separate liabilities for purposes of section 
752. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-l(h). 
6. Partner's Share ofPartnership Recourse Liabilities 
a. In General. A partnership liability is a recourse liability to the 
extent that any partner or related person bears the "economic risk 
ofloss" for that liability. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-l(a)(l). In general, 
recourse liabilities are allocated to the partner who would be 
responsible for paying them if the partnership were unable to. In 
order to determine who bears the economic risk of loss for a 
recourse liability, the regulations employ a "constructive 
liquidation" test. 
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b. Constructive Liquidation Test. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(b)(l) 
provides that upon a constructive liquidation, all of the following 
events are deemed to occur simultaneously: 
1. All of the partnership's liabilities become payable in full; 
11. With the exception of property contributed to secure a 
partnership liability, all of the partnership's assets, 
including cash, have a value of zero; 
iii. The partnership disposes of all of its propetiy in a fully 
taxable transaction for no consideration (except relief from 
liabilities for which the creditor's right to repayment is 
limited solely to one or more assets of the patinership ); 
iv. All items of income, gain, loss, or deduction are allocated 
among the partners; and 
v. The partnership liquidates. 
c. A partner bears the economic risk of loss for a liability to the 
extent that if the partnership constructively liquidated, the patiner 
(or a related person) would be obligated to either pay a creditor or 
make a contribution to the patinership because the liability would 
be due and the patiner (or related person) would not be entitled to 
reimbursement. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(b). 
d. In circumstances where a partner is entitled to reimbursement, the 
economic risk of loss is shifted to the obligor under such 
reimbursement arrangement. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(b)(3) provides 
that all statutmy and contractual obligations relating to the 
patinership liability are taken into account for purposes of 
determining which patiner bears the risk of loss, including 
1. contractual obligations outside the partnership agreement 
such as guarantees, indemnifications, reimbursement 
agreements, and other obligations running directly to 
creditors or to other partners, or to the partnership; 
ii. obligations to the patinership that are imposed by the 
partnership agreement, including the obligation to make a 
capital contribution and to restore a deficit capital account 
upon liquidation of the patinership; and 
111. payment obligations (whether in the form of direct 
remittances to another partner or a contribution to the 
partnership) imposed by state law, including the governing 
state partnership statute. 
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e. Deemed Satisfaction of Obligation. For purposes of determining 
the extent to which a partner or related person has a payment 
obligation and bears the economic risk of loss for a recourse 
liability, it is assumed that all partners and related persons actually 
perform on their obligations, irrespective of their net worth, unless 
the facts and circumstances indicate a plan to circumvent or avoid 
the obligation. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(b)(6); Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-
2(j)(3). 
1. Exception. A partner's or related person's obligation to 
make a payment may be disregarded or treated as an 
obligation of another person if the facts and circumstances 
indicate that a principal purpose of the arrangement 
between the parties is to eliminate the partner's economic 
risk ofloss with respect to the obligation or create the 
appearance that the partner or related person bears the 
economic risk of loss when, in fact, the substance of the 
arrangement is othe1wise. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(j)(l). 
f. Partner or Related Person as Nonrecourse Lender. A partner is 
considered to bear the economic risk of loss for a partnership 
liability to the extent that the partner or a related person makes (or 
acquires an interest in) a nonrecourse loan to the partnership and 
the economic risk of loss for the liability is not borne by another 
partner. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(c). 
g. De Minimis Exceptions. If a partner has a 1 0-percent or less 
interest (directly or indirectly) in each item of partnership income, 
gain, loss, deduction, or credit then the partner is not considered to 
bear the economic risk of loss with respect to: 
1. a nonrecourse loan from the partner to the partnership that 
constitutes qualified nonrecourse financing within the 
meaning of section 465(b )( 6) (determined without regard to 
the type of activity financed); or 
n. a guarantee of a loan that would othe1wise be a nonrecourse 
loan of the partnership and that would constitute qualified 
nonrecourse financing within the meaning of section 
465(b )( 6) (determined without regard to the type of activity 
financed) if the guarantor had made the loan to the 
partnership. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(d). 
h. Nonrecourse Liability with Interest Guaranteed by Partner. If one 
or more partners or related persons guarantee the payment of more 
than 25 percent of the total interest that will accme on a 
partnership nonrecourse liability over its remaining term, and it is 
6 
reasonable to expect that the guarantor will be required to pay 
substantially all of the guaranteed future interest if the partnership 
fails to do so, then the liability is treated as two separate 
partnership liabilities, a guaranteed liability and a nomecourse 
liability. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(e)(l). 
i. Reasonable Expectation of Payment by Guarantor. It is 
reasonable to expect that the guarantor will be required to 
pay substantially all of the guaranteed future interest if, 
upon a default in payment by the partnership, the lender 
can enforce the guaranty without foreclosing on the 
collateral property. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(e)(l). 
n. Portion of Stated Principal Amount Treated as Guaranteed 
Liability. The partner or related person that has guaranteed 
the payment of interest is treated as bearing the economic 
risk of loss for the partnership liability to the extent of the 
present value of the guaranteed future interest payments. 
The remainder of the stated principal amount of the 
partnership liability constitutes a nomecourse liability. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(e)(l). 
a) Discount Rate. The present value of the guaranteed 
future interest payments is computed using a 
discount rate equal to either the interest rate stated 
in the loan document, or if interest is imputed under 
section 483 or section 1274, the applicable federal 
rate, compounded semianually. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(e)(2). 
iii. Exceptions. The general rule ofTreas. Reg.§ 1.752-
2( e )(1) does not apply to a partnership nonrecourse 
liability: 
a) if the guarantee of interest by the partner or related 
person is for a period not in excess of the lesser of 
five years or one-third of the term of the liability. 
Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(e)(3); or 
b) if a partner that has a 1 0-percent or less interest 
(directly or indirectly) in each item of partnership 
income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit guarantees 
the interest on a loan to the partnership that 
constitutes qualified nomecourse financing within 
the meaning of section 465(b)(6) (determined 
without regard to the type of activity financed). An 
allocation of interest to the extent paid by the 
7 
guarantor is not treated as a partnership item of 
deduction or loss subject to the 10 percent or less 
rule. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(e)(4). 
c) Definition of Related Person. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-
4(b) generally provides that a person is related to a 
partner if the person and partner bear a relationship 
to each other that is specified in sections 267 (b) or 
707(b)(l), subject to the following modifications: 
[i] Substitute "80 percent or more" for "more 
than 50 percent" each place it appears in 
those sections; 
[ii] A person's family is detennined by 
excluding brothers and sisters; and 
[iii] Disregard sections 267(e)(l) and 
267(f)(l )(A). 
7. Partner's Share of Partnership Nonrecourse Liabilities 
a. Definition. A partnership liability is a nonrecourse liability to the 
extent that no partner or related person bears the economic risk of 
loss for that liability. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-l(a)(2). 
b. Three-Tier Allocation. A partner's share of partnership 
nonrecourse liabilities equals the sum of the following: 
1. A partner's share of partnership minimum gain determined 
pursuant to section 704(b) (the "First Tier"). Treas. Reg. § 
1.752-3(a)(l). 
a) Partnership Minimum Gain. Partnership minimum 
gain is generally the excess of the nonrecourse 
liability over the section 704(b) "book value" of 
property securing the liability. 
b) Partner's Share ofPartnership Minimum Gain. 
Treas. Reg.§ 1.704-2(g)(l) provides that a partner's 
share of partnership minimum gain at the end of any 
taxable year is generally equal to 
the sum of partnership nonrecourse deductions 
allocated to the partner up to that time and the 
distributions made to the partner up to that time of 
proceeds of a nonrecourse liability allocable to an 
increase in partnership minimum gain; minus 
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the sum ofthe partner's aggregate share of the net 
decreases in partnership minimum gain plus the 
partner's aggregate share of decreases resulting 
from revaluations of partnership property subject to 
one or more partnership nonrecourse liabilities. 
c) Partnership Nonrecourse Deductions. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(c) provides that the amount 
of nonrecourse deductions for a partnership for a 
taxable year generally equals the net increase in 
pminership minimum gain during the year, reduced 
(but not below zero) by the aggregate distributions 
made during the year of proceeds of a nonrecourse 
liability that are allocable to an increase in 
partnership minimum gain. 
ii. The amount of any taxable gain that would be allocated to 
the partner under section 704(c) (or in the same manner as 
under section 704( c) if partnership property is revalued) if 
the partnership disposed of all partnership propetiy subject 
to nonrecourse liabilities for no consideration other than 
full satisfaction ofthe liabilities. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-
3(a)(2) (the "Second Tier"). 
a) The amount computed under the Second Tier is 
sometimes referred to as "section 704( c) minimum 
gain." 
b) Where the contributed property is depreciable, the 
amount of section 704(c) minimum gain (and 
therefore the Second Tier allocation of debt) is 
reduced over time as book and tax depreciation 
deductions are claimed. When the property is fully 
depreciated, section 704(c) minimum gain and the 
Second Tier allocation will be reduced to zero. See 
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(3)(ii). 
c) For purposes of determining the amount of 
partnership liabilities that are allocable to a patiner 
under the Second Tier, where there are multiple 
properties subject to a single nonrecourse liability, 
the partnership may allocate the liability among the 
multiple properties using any reasonable method. 
Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-3(b)(l). The pmiion of the 
nonrecourse liability allocated to each item of 
partnership property is then treated as a separate 
loan. 
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d) In general, a pminership may not change the 
method of allocating a single nonrecourse liability 
among multiple properties while any portion of the 
liability is outstanding. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-3(b)(l). 
e) However, when any property previously securing 
the liability ceases to be subject to the liability, the 
pmtion of the liability allocated to that propeliy 
must be reallocated among the prope1ties still 
subject to the liability. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-3(b)(l). 
f) The method for allocation of the liability is not 
reasonable if it allocates to any item of prope1iy an 
amount of the liability that, when combined with 
any other liabilities allocated to the prope1ty, is in 
excess of the fair market value of the property at the 
time the liability is incurred. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-
3(b )(1 ). 
111. The paliner's share of the excess nonrecourse liabilities 
determined in accordance with the paliner's share of 
partnership profits. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-3(a)(3) (the "Third 
Tier"). 
a) The partner's interest in palinership profits is 
determined by taking into account all facts and 
circumstances related to the economic arrangement 
of the paliners. 
b) The palinership agreement may specify the 
paliner' s interest in palinership profits for purposes 
of allocating excess nonrecourse liabilities provided 
the interest so specified is reasonably consistent 
with allocations (that have substantial economic 
effect under the section 7 04(b) regulations) of some 
significant item of partnership income or gain. 
c) Altematively, excess nonrecourse liabilities may be 
allocated among the partners in accordance with the 
manner in which it is reasonably expected that the 
deductions attributable to those nonrecourse 
liabilities will be allocated. 
d) Additionally, the palinership may frrst allocate 
excess nonrecourse liabilities to a paliner up to the 
amount of built-in gain that is allocable to the 
partner on section 704( c) property or property for 
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which reverse section 704( c) allocations are 
applicable by virtue of a book-up (as described in 
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(6)(i)) where such property 
is subject to the nomecourse liability to the extent 
that such built-in gain exceeds the amount of gain 
taken into account under the Second Tier with 
respect to such property. 
c. Interplay With Section 704(c) Method 
1. Rev. Rul. 95-41, 1995-1 C.B. 132, explains how section 
704( c) affects allocations of nomecourse liabilities under 
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3(a). 
n. Allocations under the First Tier are not affected by section 
704(c). 
111. Allocations under the Second Tier take into account 
remedial allocations of gain that would be made to the 
contributing partner under Treas. Reg. § 1. 704-3( d), but do 
not take into account curative allocations under 
Treas. Reg. § 1. 704-3( c). 
iv. Allocations under the Third Tier are affected by section 
704(c) as follows: 
a) If the partnership determines the partners' interests 
in partnership profits based on all the facts and 
circumstances relating to the economic arrangement 
of the partners, section 704(c) built-in gain that was 
taken into account under the Second Tier is one 
factor, but not the only factor, to be considered 
under the Third Tier. 
b) If the pminership chooses to allocate excess 
nomecourse liabilities in a manner reasonably 
consistent with allocations (that have substantial 
economic effect under the section 704(b) 
regulations) of some other significant item of 
partnership income or gain, section 704( c) does not 
affect the allocation of nomecourse liabilities under 
the Third Tier because section 704( c) allocations do 
not have substantial economic effect. 
c) If the partnership chooses to allocate the Third Tier 
in accordance with the manner in which it is 
reasonably expected that deductions attributable to 
the nomecourse debt will be allocated, the 
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partnership must take into account the section 
704( c) allocations in determining the manner in 
which the deductions attributable to the nonrecourse 
liabilities will be allocated. 
d. Rev. Rul. 95-41 Importance Eclipsed. The importance of the 
holding ofRev. Rul. 95-41 regarding the impact of section 
704( c )in determining the Third Tier allocation has been eclipsed 
by the rule in Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3(a)(3) allowing the Third Tier 
to be allocated first to a partner up to the amount of built-in gain 
allocable to such partner not taken into account in the Second Tier, 
which was added by an amendment to Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3(a)(3) 
issued October 30, 2000. 
8. Disregarded Entities 
a. In General. 
i. On August 12, 2004, the Service issued proposed 
regulations addressing the consequences of owning a 
partnership interest through a disregarded entity (such as a 
single owner LLC) on the allocation of partnership 
liabilities under section 752. 
ii. On October 11, 2006, the Service issued final regulations 
that largely follow the proposed regulations. The final 
regulations seek to clarify the effect of the state law 
liability shield provided by the disregarded entity in 
determining the extent to which a partner who owns a 
partnership interest through a disregarded entity may be 
treated as bearing the economic risk of loss for a 
partnership liability. The final regulations are effective for 
liabilities incurred or assumed by a partnership on or after 
October 11, 2006 other than liabilities incurred or assumed 
by a partnership pursuant to a written binding contract in 
effect prior to October 11, 2006. 
111. The final regulations are unquestionably based on a sound 
analysis of the extent to which a partner who owns a 
partnership interest through a disregarded entity bears the 
economic risk of loss for a partnership liability. This 
theoretical purity, however, comes at the cost of significant 
taxpayer compliance burdens in an area where, based on 
informal conversations with government representatives 
involved in developing the regulations, there was no 
evidence of taxpayer abuse. Moreover, in a closely related 
area, the existing section 752 regulations deliberately 
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sacrifice theory in favor of administrability, and the final 
regulations create inconsistencies with those existing 
prOVISIOnS. 
b. The Final Regulations 
1. In General. The final regulations provide that in 
dete1mining the extent to which a partner bears the 
economic risk of loss for a partnership liability, payment 
obligations of a disregarded entity are taken into account 
for purposes of section 752 only to the extent of the "net 
value" of the disregarded entity as of the date on which the 
partnership determines the partner's share of partnership 
liabilities pursuant to Treas. Reg.§§ 1.752-4(d) and 1.705-
l(a). The new rules apply to business entities such as 
single owner LLCs that are disregarded as separate from 
their owner under Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 through 
301.7701-3, as well as to "qualified REIT subsidiaries" 
under section 856(i) and "qualified subchapter S 
subsidiaries" under section 13 61 (b )(3). 
n. Net Value Dete1mination 
a) Under Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(k)(2), the "net value" 
of a disregarded entity is equal to the fair market 
value of all assets owned by the disregarded entity 
that may be subject to the claims of creditors, less 
obligations of the disregarded entity that do not 
constitute payment obligations of the disregarded 
entity that are taken into account under Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.752-2(b) in determining the extent to which a 
partner bears the economic risk of loss for a 
partnership liability. For this purpose, a disregarded 
entity's assets include the entity's enforceable rights 
to contributions from its owner, but exclude the 
disregarded entity's interest in the partnership (if 
any). Likewise, the value of any property of the 
disregarded entity that is pledged to secure a 
partnership liability and therefore taken into account 
under the pledge rule ofTreas. Reg. § 1.752-2(h) is 
excluded. The final regulations clarify that the 
value of the disregarded entity's interest in a 
partnership other than the partnership for which the 
net value determination is being made is included in 
the net value of the disregarded entity. 
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b) In determining the net value of the disregarded 
entity, the final regulations require that any 
subsequent reduction in net value be taken into 
account if at the time the net value is determined it 
is anticipated that the reduction will occur and the 
reduction is part of a plan that has as one of its 
principal purposes creating the appearance that a 
partner bears the economic risk of loss for a 
partnership liability. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(k)(4). 
In addition, if one or more disregarded entities have 
payment obligations with respect to one or more 
partnership liabilities, or liabilities of more than one 
partnership, the partnership must allocate the net 
value of each disregarded entity among partnership 
liabilities in a reasonable and consistent manner, 
taking into account priorities among pminership 
liabilities. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(k)(3). 
111. Redetennination of Net Value 
a) Under the final regulations, once the net value of 
the disregarded entity is determined, this net value 
is not redetermined unless (i) there is more than a de 
minimis contribution to the disregarded entity of 
property other than property pledged to secure a 
partnership liability, unless the contribution is 
followed immediately by a contribution of equal net 
value by the disregarded entity to the partnership for 
which the net value of the disregarded entity 
otherwise would be determined, taking into account 
any obligations assumed or taken subject to in 
connection with such contributions; (ii) there is 
more than a de minimis distribution from the 
disregarded entity of property other than property 
pledged to secure a partnership liability, unless the 
distribution immediately follows a distribution of 
equal net value to the disregarded entity by the 
partnership for which the net value of the 
disregarded entity would otherwise be determined, 
taking into account any obligations assumed or 
taken subject to in connection with such 
distributions; (iii) a change in the legally 
enforceable obligation of the owner of the 
disregarded entity to make contributions to the 
disregarded entity; (iv) the incurrence, refinancing, 
or assumption of an obligation of the disregarded 
entity that does not constitute a Treas. Reg. § 1.752-
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2(b) payment obligation of the disregarded entity; 
(v) the sale or exchange of a non-de minimis asset 
of the disregarded entity (in a transaction that is not 
in the ordinary course ofbusiness). Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.752-2(k)(2). 
b) The final regulations provide that a disposition of a 
non-de minimis asset requires an adjustment to the 
net value of the disregarded entity only to the extent 
such asset changed in value, without valuing other 
assets held by the disregarded entity. 
c) The final regulations provide that the net value of 
the disregarded entity must be determined as of the 
earlier of (A) the first date occurring on or after the 
date on which the requirement to determine the net 
value of the disregarded entity arises on which the 
partnership otherwise determines a partner's share 
of patinership liabilities under Treas. Reg. § 1. 705-
l(a) and Treas. Reg. § 1.752-4(d), or (B) the end of 
the partnership's taxable year in which the 
requirement to detetmine the net value of the 
disregarded entity arises. 
IV. Reporting Requirement. The final regulations impose a 
reporting obligation on partners who own partnership 
interests through disregarded entities in order to enable the 
partnership to properly allocate liabilities. Treas. Reg. § 
1.752-2(k)(5) requires that a patiner that may be treated as 
bearing the economic risk of loss for a partnership liability 
based upon an obligation of a disregarded entity must 
provide information as to the entity's tax classification and 
net value to the patinership on a timely basis. 
v. Pledged Property; Conforming Changes 
a) The final regulations clarify the mle ofTreas. Reg. 
§ 1. 752-2(h) (which generally provides that a 
partner bears the economic risk of loss to the extent 
of the value of the partner's separate property 
pledged as security for a partnership liability) by 
providing that the extent to which a partner bears 
the economic risk of loss for a partnership liability 
as a result of a direct or indirect pledge is limited to 
the net fair market value of the propetiy. The final 
regulations further provide that if additional 
property is made subject to a pledge, the addition is 
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treated as a new pledge and the net fair market 
value of all of the pledged property must be 
determined at that time. In addition, if pledged 
property is subject to one or more other obligations, 
those obligations must be taken into account in 
determining the net fair market value of pledge 
property at the time of the pledge or contribution. 
The preamble to the final regulations states that the 
Service and Treasury may continue to study 
whether further modifications to the pledge rule are 
necessary. 
b) The final regulations also include conforming 
changes to Treas. Reg. §1.704-2(±)(2), (g)(3) and 
(i)(4). Those rules provide ce1iain exceptions from 
the minimum gain charge back requirements of the 
section 704(b) regulations that apply when the 
character of partnership debt under section 752 
changes as a result of a guarantee, lapse of a 
guarantee, conversion, refinancing or other change 
in the debt instrument. Under the final regulations, 
those rules would apply upon any change in the 
character of partnership debt under section 752, 
whether as a result of the circumstances specified in 
the cmrent regulations or as a result of changes 
under the rules of the final regulations. 
Vl. Extension of Rules to Other Entities. The preamble to the 
proposed regulations stated that "[t]he IRS and Treasmy 
Department are considering and request comments 
regarding whether the rules of the proposed regulations 
should be extended to payment obligations of other entities, 
such as entities that are capitalized with nominal equity." 
The final regulations do not extend the net value approach 
to thinly capitalized entities. However, the preamble to the 
final regulations states that the Service and Treasury may 
continue to study this issue. 
c. Comments and Observations on the Regulations 
1. Should the "Deemed Satisfaction" Rule Apply to 
Disregarded Entities? 
a) As discussed above, the "deemed satisfaction" rule 
ofTreas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(6) provides that for 
purposes of determining the extent to which a 
partner or related person has a payment obligation 
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and bears the economic risk of loss for a recourse 
liability, all pminers and related persons are 
assumed to actually perform their obligations, 
irrespective of their net worth, unless the facts and 
circumstances indicate a plan to circumvent or 
avoid the obligation. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(j) 
provides anti-abuse rules that prevent manipulation 
or abuse of the "deemed satisfaction" rule. Treas. 
Reg. § 1. 752-2(j)(l) states that an obligation of a 
partner or related person to make a payment may be 
disregarded or treated as an obligation of another 
person for purposes of the section 752 regulations if 
facts and circumstances indicate that a principal 
purpose of the arrangement between the parties is to 
eliminate the partner's economic risk of loss with 
respect to that obligation or create the appearance of 
the partner or related person bearing the economic 
risk of loss when, in fact, the substance of the 
arrangement is othe1wise. Likewise, Treas. Reg.§ 
1.752-2(j)(3) provides that an obligation of a pminer 
to make a payment is not recognized if the facts and 
circumstances evidence a plan to circumvent or 
avoid the obligation. 
b) Instead of the net value approach taken by the final 
regulations, the final regulations could simply have 
clarified that the "deemed satisfaction" rule and 
anti-abuse backstop apply to obligations of 
disregarded entities. Under such an approach, the 
fact that a disregarded entity that provides state law 
liability protection is the obligor on a payment 
obligation would not be taken into account in 
determining whether the disregarded entity's owner 
bears the economic risk of loss for a partnership 
liability, unless the facts and circumstances 
evidence a plan to circumvent or avoid the 
obligation. That is, the same rules that apply with 
respect to regarded entities would be applied to 
disregarded entities. 
c) As illustrated by the following examples, the failure 
to apply the "deemed satisfaction" rule and anti-
abuse backstop results in economically similar 
arrangements being treated differently. 
d) Example 1. 
17 
[i] Taxpayer is the sole owner of an LLC that 
owns two assets: an interest as the sole 
general partner in a limited partnership, and 
land worth $20,000. The partnership has a 
liability that constitutes a general obligation 
ofthe partnership of$100,000. 
[ii] Under Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(k) and Treas. 
Reg. § 1.752-1(i), the $100,000 liability is 
bifurcated and treated as a recourse liability 
of $20,000 with respect to which the 
taxpayer bears the economic risk of loss and 
a nomecourse liability of $80,000. 5 Thus, 
the taxpayer includes $20,000 of the liability 
in the basis of its interest in the partnership 
as a recourse liability with respect to which 
the taxpayer bears the economic risk of loss. 
e) Example 2. 
[i] The facts are the same as in Example 1, 
except that the taxpayer owns a 99% interest 
in the LLC and the taxpayer's affiliate owns 
a 1% interest. The final regulations are 
inapplicable because the LLC is a regarded 
entity taxable as a patinership. 
[ii] If the "deemed satisfaction" rule of Treas. 
Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(6) applies, the entire 
$100,000 liability is treated as a recourse 
obligation of the LLC and is includible in 
the basis of the taxpayer and its affiliate. 6 
On the other hand, if the anti-abuse backstop 
5 Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(i) states that if one or more partners bears the economic risk ofloss 
as to part, but not all, of a partnership liability represented by a single contractual obligation, that 
liability is treated as two or more separate liabilities for purposes of section 752. The portion of 
the liability as to which one or more partners bear the economic risk of loss is a recourse liability 
and the remainder of the liability, if any, is a nomecourse liability. 
6 The LLC would bear the economic risk of loss with respect to the $100,000 liability and 
thus would be allocated the entire liability. See Treas. Reg. § 1 752-2(i). The $100,000 liability 
would then be treated as a liability of the LLC and allocated to the taxpayer and its affiliate in 
accordance with the rules for allocating nomecourse liabilities (because neither the taxpayer nor 
its affiliate would bear the economic risk ofloss for the liability). See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-4(a). 
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mle ofTreas. Reg. § 1.752-2(j) applies 
because the facts and circumstances 
evidence a plan to circumvent or avoid the 
obligation, then the obligation of the LLC is 
not recognized, the liability is treated as 
nonrecourse and no portion of the $100,000 
liability is allocated to the LLC as a recourse 
liability. 7 
f) In terms of their actual exposure to economic loss 
on account ofthe $100,000 liability, the taxpayers 
in Examples 1 and 2 are identically situated. 
Nevertheless, the regulations provide for three 
different allocations of the liability depending on 
the details of the ownership stmcture and the 
application of the anti-abuse backstop mle. 
g) The preamble to the proposed regulations 
acknowledged that applying the "deemed 
satisfaction" mle would lead to the conclusion that 
payment obligations of a disregarded entity should 
be allocated to its owner for tax purposes because 
the owner and the disregarded entity are treated as a 
single entity for Federal income tax purposes. 
Nevertheless, the final regulations adopt the net 
value approach discussed above. The preamble to 
the proposed regulations states that "because only 
the assets of a disregarded entity may be available 
to satisfy payment obligations undertaken by the 
disregarded entity, a partner should be treated as 
bearing the economic risk of loss for a partnership 
liability as a result of those payment obligations 
only to the extent of the net value of the disregarded 
entity's assets." While that logic is unassailable, 
interests of administrability would argue in favor of 
extending the "deemed satisfaction" mle to 
disregarded entities, particularly in light of the fact 
that government representatives involved in 
developing the regulations have indicated 
7 In both Example 1 and Example 2, to the extent the $100,000 liability is treated as a 
nonrecourse liability of the partnership, some portion may still be allocated to the taxpayer and 
its affiliate under the mles relating to the allocation of nonrecourse liabilities. See generally 
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3. 
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informally that they are not aware of any evidence 
of taxpayer abuse in this area. Nevertheless, 
Treasury and the Service made the call the other 
way. 
11. Time for Determining Liability Shares 
a) Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(k)(2)(iv) requires that the net 
value of a disregarded entity be determined "on the 
earlier of (A) the first date occmTing on or after the 
date on which the requirement to determine the net 
value of a disregarded entity arises under paragraph 
(k)(2)(ii)(A) or (B) of this section on which the 
partnership otherwise determines a partner's share 
of partnership liabilities under§§ 1.705-l(a) and 
1.752-4(d); or (B) the end of the partnership's 
taxable year in which the requirement to determine 
the net value of a disregarded entity arises under 
paragraph (k)(2)(ii)(A) or (B). Treas. Reg. § 1.752-
4(d) states that "[a] partner's share ofpartnership 
liabilities must be determined whenever the 
determination is necessary in order to determine the 
tax liability of the partner or any other person." 
Treas. Reg.§ 1.705-l(a) states that: 
A partner is required to determine 
the adjusted basis of his interest in a 
partnership only when necessary for 
the determination of his tax liability 
or that of any other person. The 
determination of the adjusted basis 
of a partnership interest is ordinarily 
made as of the end of a partnership 
taxable year. 
b) Under section 731(a)(l), a partner must recognize 
gain to the extent that any money distributed 
exceeds the adjusted basis of such partner's interest 
in the partnership immediately before the 
distribution. Moreover, a decrease in a partner's 
share of liabilities is treated as a deemed 
distribution of money under section 7 5 2(b) that 
potentially triggers gain under section 731(a)(l). 
As a result, it appears that a partnership must 
determine liability shares whenever there is a 
decrease in any partner's share (which may be 
attributable to an increase in another partner's 
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share), because the decrease must be compared 
against the partner's basis immediately before to 
determine if gain is triggered. 
c) Nevertheless, examples in the final regulations 
appear to assume that the partnership only 
determines liability shares at the end of the tax year. 
In Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(k)(6), Example 2, A forms 
a wholly owned LLC in 2007 with a capital 
contribution of $100,000, which LLC contributes to 
a limited partnership. LLC is the only partner with 
a capital account deficit restoration obligation. In 
2008, LLC bonows $300,000 on a recourse basis. 
As ofDecember 31,2008, when the partnership 
first dete1mines liability shares, no portion of the 
liability is treated as recourse with respect to LLC 
because LLC has no net value. Thereafter, on 
January 1, 2009, A contributes $250,000 to LLC, 
and on Januaty 5, 2009, LLC bonows $100,000, 
and purchases land for $350,000, which declines in 
value to $275,000 by December 31, 2009. 
d) In analyzing the results for 2009, Treas. Reg. § 
1.752-2(k)(6), Example 2 concludes that because 
the partnership dete1mines debt shares as of year-
end, $175,000 of the partnership's liabilities are 
treated as recourse with respect to LLC, which is 
equal to the net value of LLC on December 31, 
2009. In fact, however, it appears that the 
partnership would be required by Treas. Reg. § 
1.752-4(d) to determine debt shares as ofthe 
Janua1y 1, 2009 date of A's capital contribution to 
LLC, because as of that date a portion of the 
patinership's liabilities would become recourse with 
respect to LLC, thereby producing a deemed 
distribution to the other partners under section 
752(b) that is potentially taxable to them under 
section 731(a)(1)(a). Moreover, applying the net 
value test on January 1, 2009 creates different 
results, because the equity value of the property 
owned by LLC on Janua1y 1, 2009 is $250,000 
(rather than $175,000 at year end). Furthe1more, no 
event occurs between Janumy 5 and December 31, 
2009 that would allow a redetermination ofLLC's 
net value. Thus, on the facts ofTreas. Reg.§ 1.752-
2(k)(6), Example 2, whether $175,000 or $250,000 
of partnership liabilities are treated as recourse with 
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respect to LLC depends on the time the partnership 
is required to determine liabilities. 
111. Reporting and Compliance Issues. 
a) As discussed above, Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(k)(5) 
requires that a partner that may be treated as bearing 
the economic risk of loss for a partnership liability 
based upon an obligation of a disregarded entity 
must provide information as to the entity's tax 
classification and net value to the partnership on a 
timely basis. 
b) The regulations do not address a variety of related 
reporting and compliance issues raised by the net 
value approach. What level of diligence is required 
of the disregarded entity in determining its net 
value? Are appraisals of assets required? Is expert 
evaluation of contingent obligations that may 
reduce net value required? Is annual reporting to 
the partnership sufficient, or is more frequent 
reporting required if an event occurs that requires 
redetermination of value? Is a statement that the net 
value of the disregarded entity exceeds its payment 
obligations sufficient, or must the disregarded entity 
report a dollar amount for its net value (thereby 
revealing potentially confidential financial 
information)? May the partnership simply accept 
the information as repmied by the disregarded 
entity, or does the partnership have an obligation to 
investigate or confirm the information? How 
should the partnership allocate its liabilities if the 
disregarded entity fails to supply the required 
information? 
c) These and other questions relating to compliance 
with the new rules await further explication. 
1v. "Obligations" of Disregarded Entity Taken into Account 
a) As discussed above, pursuant to Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.752-2(k)(2), the "net value" of a disregarded 
entity is equal to the fair market value of all assets 
owned by the disregarded entity that may be subject 
to the claims of creditors, "less obligations of the 
disregarded entity that do not constitute Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.752-2(b)(l) payment obligations ofthe 
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disregarded entity." The second use of the word 
"obligations" in the quoted language clearly refers 
to obligations described in Treas. Reg. § 1.752-
2(b)(l). The first use of the word "obligations" 
apparently is intended to refer to some broader 
category. Informal discussions with government 
officials involved in developing the regulations 
confirm that the first use of the word "obligations" 
is intended to be vety broad and would encompass, 
for example, an obligation to make payments under 
a lease. Assuming that first use of the word 
"obligations" includes an obligation to make 
payments under a lease, it is not clear how such an 
obligation should be taken into account. For 
example, is the stream of required lease payments to 
be discounted to present value at a particular 
interest rate? Or is the obligation to make payments 
under a lease taken into account only to the extent 
that the lease is at an above market rent such that 
the taxpayer would pay to be relieved of the 
obligation? The final regulations could have 
referred to the definition of obligations contained in 
Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-l(a)(l)(ii), as follows: 
(ii) Obligation. For purposes of this 
paragraph and§ 1.752-7, an obligation is 
any fixed or contingent obligation to 
make payment without regard to whether 
the obligation is otherwise taken into 
account for purposes of the Internal 
Revenue Code. Obligations include, but 
are not limited to, debt obligations, 
environmental obligations, tort 
obligations, contract obligations, pension 
obligations, obligations under a short 
sale, and obligations under derivative 
financial instruments such as options, 
forward contracts, and futures contracts. 
b) Presumably, the "amount" of any such obligation 
should be the amount of cash that a willing assignor 
would pay to a willing assignee to assume the 
obligation in an arm's-length transaction. See 
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-7(b )(3)(ii). 
v. Conforming Changes to Section 704(b) Regulations 
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a) The section 704(b) regulations contain an anti-abuse 
rule that is similar to the anti-abuse rule in the 
section 752 regulations that "backstops" the 
"deemed satisfaction" rule. Specifically, Treas. 
Reg.§ 1.704-l(b)(2)(ii)(c) provides: 
A partner in no event will be considered 
obligated to restore the deficit balance in 
his capital account to the partnership (in 
accordance with requirement (3) of 
paragraph (b )(2)(ii)(b) of this section) to 
the extent such partner's obligation is 
not legally enforceable, or the facts and 
circumstances otherwise indicate a plan 
to avoid or circumvent such obligation. 
b) Consistent with the treatment of disregarded entities 
under the final regulations, Treas. Reg. § 1.704-
l(b)(2)(ii)(c) should be amended to provide that a 
deficit restoration obligation of a disregarded entity 
will only be taken into account for purposes of the 
regulations under section 704(b) to the extent of the 
net value of the disregarded entity. 
v1. Allocation ofNet Value. 
a) Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(k)(3) provides that if one or 
more disregarded entities have payment obligations 
with respect to one or more partnership liabilities, 
or liabilities of more than one partnership, the 
partnership must allocate the net value of each 
disregarded entity among partnership liabilities in a 
reasonable and consistent manner, taking into 
account priorities among partnership liabilities. 
b) Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(k)(6), Example 4, concludes 
that an allocation of net value first to the 
partnership's senior debt and only thereafter to its 
junior debt is a reasonable method of allocating net 
value. In fact, the partnership's property will be 
used to satisfy its senior debt first, so it is more 
likely that the disregarded entity's net value will be 
used to satisfy the pminership's junior debt. 
c) Thus, arguably, it would make more sense to 
allocate the net value of the disregarded entity to 
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junior debt first. C£ Treas. Reg. § 1. 704-2(m), 
Example 1 (vii). 
d) Informal discussions with govemment personnel 
involved in developing the regulations indicate that 
they view the allocation of net value to senior debt 
first as consistent with the constructive liquidation 
test of the section 752 regulations, but that in certain 
circumstances, it might be reasonable to allocate to 
the junior debt first. 
B. TECHNIQUES FOR MANAGING LIABILITY ALLOCATIONS 
1. Introduction. This Part II.B. illustrates various techniques for managing 
the allocation of liabilities through a series of examples in the context of a 
limited partnership as well as the various special considerations that arise 
in the context of limited liability companies. 
2. Managing Liability Allocations in Limited Partnerships 
a. Example 3: Nonrecourse Debt; Conventional Guarantee. Assume 
that X is a limited partner in a limited partnership and is allocated 
one percent of partnership profits and losses. The partnership's 
only debt is a nonrecourse debt of $100 from a third party. 
Assume that X must maintain a share of the debt at least equal to 
$10 in order to avoid receiving a deemed distribution under section 
752(b) that will exceed X's basis in its partnership interest and 
trigger gain under section 731(a). X enters into a guarantee of$10 
of the debt that is legally enforceable under state law. Under the 
guarantee, X has no right of subrogation against any other party. 
1. Tax Consequences. The guarantee should cause $10 of the 
debt to be allocated to X. X bears the economic risk of loss 
with respect to $10 of the liability. The liability is treated 
as two separate liabilities for purposes of section 7 52: a $10 
recourse liability and a $90 nonrecourse liability. 
Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-l(i). Upon a constructive liquidation, 
all assets of the partnership would have a value of zero, and 
any assets securing the nonrecourse liability would be 
conveyed to the lender in satisfaction of the nonrecourse 
debt. X would be obligated to pay $10 to the lender and 
would not have any right to recover the payment from any 
other party. Accordingly, X bears the economic risk of loss 
for $10 and is allocated $10 of the debt. See 
Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(£), Example 5. 
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n. Maintaining an Amount At-Risk Under Section 465 With a 
Guarantee 
a) Section 465(a) generally provides that, in the case 
of an individual and certain closely held 
corporations, any loss from an activity for the 
taxable year shall be allowed only to the extent of 
the aggregate amount with respect to which the 
taxpayer is at risk at the close of the taxable year. 
b) Section 465( e )(1) provides that if a taxpayer's at-
risk amount is reduced below zero then losses 
previously allowed for a taxable year to which the 
rules apply are recaptured to the extent of the 
negative amount. 
c) Section 465(b) provides that a taxpayer is 
considered at risk to the extent of any money 
contributed to an activity by the taxpayer, and with 
respect to any money borrowed by the taxpayer to 
be used in the activity, to the extent that the 
taxpayer is personally liable for repayment, subject 
to certain exceptions. 
d) As discussed in more detail below, case law 
supports the conclusion that a properly structured 
guarantee increases a partner's amount at risk. 
b. Example 4: Nonrecourse Debt; "Bottom" Guarantee. 
1. The facts are the same as the facts in Example 3, except 
that X enters into a $10 "bottom" guarantee of the debt. A 
"bottom guarantee" is a guarantee of the last dollars of the 
debt, which is the least risky portion of the debt. The 
"bottom" guarantee provides: 
"X shall not be obligated to make any payment 
hereunder until all attempts to collect from 
Borrower, with due diligence and using reasonable 
means, have failed to produce gross proceeds to 
Lender (not taking into account any costs incurred 
by the Lender in collecting such proceeds) of at 
least $10. Such attempts shall include the 
exhaustion of all rights and remedies at law and in 
equity that Lender may have against Borrower and 
the Collateral securing the Loan." 
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Thus, in general, X will only have economic exposure 
under the bottom guaranty to the extent the value of the 
collateral declines below $10. 
11. Tax Consequences. Although as a practical matter, a 
decline in the value of the collateral to below $10 may be 
unlikely, X would be considered to bear the economic risk 
of loss with respect to $10 of the debt because the 
constructive liquidation analysis ofTreas. Reg. § 1.752-
2(b )(1) assumes that the value of all partnership assets is 
zero. Accordingly, the "bottom" guarantee would cause 
$10 of the debt to be allocated to X. 
111. The fact that the "bottom" guarantee may be entered into 
with a tax motivation should not detract from this 
conclusion. 
a) Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(b) contains no inquily into 
tax motivation or purpose, but only as to economic 
risk of loss. In addition, Treas. Reg. § 1. 704-2(m), 
Example 1 (vii) specifically addresses the 
consequences of a "bottom" guarantee on the 
computation of "minimum gain" under the section 
704(b) regulations, but does not in any way suggest 
that the "bottom" guarantee is illusory or should be 
disregarded. 
b) Likewise, Treas. Reg. I. 73 7 -4(b ), Example 2 
involves a fact pattem in which a partner guarantees 
a partnership nonrecourse debt with a principal 
purpose of increasing the partner's basis under 
section 752(a) and avoiding gain under section 737. 
(Section 737 generally requires gain recognition in 
the case of certain distributions of property to a 
partner to the extent the fair market value of the 
property exceeds the partner's basis in the 
partnership interest). Notwithstanding this 
malicious principal purpose, the example concludes 
that the basis increase under section 752(a) must be 
given effect and that the section 737 gain is 
therefore avoided. 
1v. Therefore, a "bottom" guarantee allows a partner to 
maintain a required level of partnership debt allocation with 
significantly less risk than a conventional guarantee. 
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v. An issue arises as to who bears the ultimate "economic risk 
of loss" when a limited partner of a partnership guarantees 
an othetwise nonrecourse debt of the patinership and the 
general partner has a capital account deficit restoration 
obligation ("DRO"). Accordingly, when structuring a 
guarantee arrangement, the documents should provide that 
in the event that the general partner has a DRO, the specific 
debt subject to the limited partner's guarantee is, in effect, 
excluded from the general patiner's DRO. In addition, for 
the guarantee to be effective, the limited partner must 
waive its right of subrogation against the partnership. 
c. Example 5: Recourse Debt; Conventional Guarantee. The facts 
are the same as in Example 3, except that the debt is recourse. 
1. Tax Consequences. X's guarantee will not cause $10 of 
debt to be allocated to X. Upon a constructive liquidation, 
all assets of the patinership have a value of zero. Because 
the debt is recourse, the lender can proceed against the 
general patiner's separate assets to collect the debt. 
Alternatively, the general partner may be viewed as having 
an obligation to make a contribution to the partnership to 
enable it to pay the debt. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(f), Example 
3. Moreover, subject to an anti-abuse rule to prevent 
manipulation, all patiners and related persons who have 
obligations to make payments are presumed to perform 
those obligations, irrespective of their actual net worth. 
Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(b)(6). Accordingly, the general 
partner is deemed to satisfy the debt and the lender is 
deemed not to call upon X's guarantee. Therefore, X is 
deemed not to be required to make a payment on the 
guarantee and X does not bear the risk of loss for any pa1i 
of the debt. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(f), Example 3. 
d. Example 6: Recourse Debt; Indemnification Obligation. The facts 
are the same as the facts in Example 5, except that instead of 
entering into a guarantee of the recourse debt, X enters into an 
indemnification agreement with the general partner ofX's limited 
partnership under which X would indemnify the general partner for 
up to $10 if the general partner is required to make a payment on 
the debt. 
1. Tax Consequences. As a result of the indemnification 
agreement, X bears the ultimate risk of loss with respect to 
$10 of the debt because X would be required to make a $10 
payment to the general partner under the constructive 
liquidation analysis where all of the partnership's assets 
28 
have a value of zero. Accordingly, X is allocated $10 of 
the debt. 
e. Termination of a Guarantee or Indemnification Agreement. In 
some cases, a partner that enters into a guarantee or 
indemnification agreement in order to receive a debt allocation will 
want the guarantee or indemnification to terminate upon the 
partner's exit from the partnership. 
1. Various approaches have been taken by practitioners to 
terminate a guarantee or indemnification agreement. 
a) Some guarantees or indemnity agreements are 
structured so that they can be terminated at will, 
provided that an independent appraisal of the 
property subject to the debt establishes that the 
property has a value equal to the outstanding debt 
on the property or a multiple thereof. The appraisal 
requirement should prevent the Service from 
arguing that a guarantee or indemnity agreement is 
illusory because a guarantor could not terminate the 
agreement if the guarantor would otherwise be 
called upon to perfmm on the agreement. In 
addition, the "constructive liquidation" analysis 
looks at a specific point in time for purposes of 
allocating liabilities. There is no inquily regarding 
the future termination of a guarantee. 
b) Limited partners in umbrella partnership real estate 
investment trusts ("UPREIT") may structure 
guarantees or indemnities that expire upon the 
conversion of operating partnership ("OP") units 
("OP Units") to stock of the real estate investment 
trust ("REIT"). 8 
8 An UPREIT is a REIT where substantially all of the assets of the REIT are owned 
through an OP composed of the REIT as general partner and others as limited partners. Limited 
partners in the OP typically have the option to exchange OP Units for common stock of the REIT 
on a one-for-one basis. For further discussion of debt management issues in the context of 
REIT's, see Blake D. Rubin, Andrea R. Macintosh and Jonathan I. Forrest, Doing A Deal With 
A REIT: The Property Owner's Perspective, New York University 5ih Institute on Federal 
Taxation§ 15.01 (1999). 
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c) An automatic tetmination seems literally to be 
effective under the constructive liquidation analysis 
because it looks only at a specific point in time for 
purposes of allocating liabilities. 
d) However, allowing a guarantee or indemnification 
agreement to automatically expire upon conversion 
of OP Units to REIT stock may raise questions 
about the validity of the entire anangement. For 
example, where a limited patiner in an operating 
partnership can convert its OP Units into stock at 
any time, it follows that any time that it appears that 
the limited patiner would be called upon to perform 
on the guarantee or indemnity, the limited partner 
could conveti its OP Units to REIT stock in order to 
avoid incuning liability. The Service may attempt 
to attack the guarantee or indemnity and deny the 
allocation of debt to the limited partner under these 
circumstances. 
e) A safer approach is to establish a tetm for the 
guarantee or indemnity. Under this structure, the 
guarantee or indemnity can be renewed at the option 
of the limited partner, but the limited patiner could 
not terminate the guarantee or indemnity at will. 
f) The most conservative approach would be to 
provide that the guarantee or indemnity continues in 
full force and effect until repayment of the 
underlying indebtedness. 
f. Example 7: Recourse Debt; Conventional DRO. The facts are the 
same as the facts in Example 3, except that, instead of entering into 
a guarantee, X enters into a DRO for $10. Under the DRO, upon 
liquidation ofX's interest in the partnership, X will be obligated to 
make a capital contribution to the patinership equal to the lesser of 
$10 or the amount ofX's deficit capital account. Assume further 
that the partnership agreement meets the requirements of the safe 
harbor ofTreas. Reg. § 1.704-l(b)(2), and that, in lieu of the one 
percent allocation of losses to X described in Example 3, the 
partnership agreement requires that X be allocated all losses until 
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X's capital account equals ($10). Finally, assume that the "book" 
balance sheet of the partnership reflects the following: 9 
Property 80 100 Liability 
( .20) X 
(19.80) Other Partners 
1. Tax Consequences. X's DRO should cause $10 ofthe debt 
to be allocated to X. Upon a constructive liquidation of the 
partnership, the Property would have a zero value and the 
partnership would be deemed to dispose of it for no 
consideration, resulting in an $80 loss. Of this amount, 
$9.80 would be allocated to X and the balance would be 
allocated to the other partners. X would have a deficit 
capital account of $10, and would be required to contribute 
this amount to the partnership. As a result, X would bear 
the economic risk of loss for $10 of the debt. See 
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(£), Example 2. 
g. Example 8: Recourse Debt; "Bottom" DRO. Through careful 
drafting of the loss allocation, X's DRO could be turned into a 
"bottom" DRO. That is, the first $70.20 ofloss on disposition of 
the Property could be allocated to partners other than X, and only 
the final $9.80 ofloss could be allocated to X. As a result, only if 
the Property declined in value below $9.80 would X actually 
receive a loss allocation that increases X's deficit capital account 
and thus X's obligation to make a capital contribution. 
1. Tax Consequences. Like a conventional DRO, a "bottom" 
DRO should cause $10 of the debt to be allocated to X 
because the value of the property would be deemed to be 
zero under the constructive liquidation analysis and X 
would be required to satisfy its obligations under the DRO. 
Thus, X would bear the risk of loss with respect to $10 of 
the debt. 
9 
"Book" capital accounts are capital accounts maintained in accordance with the capital 
account maintenance rules set forth in Treas. Reg.§ 1.704-1(b)(2). "Tax basis" capital accounts 
are maintained in the same manner as "book" capital accounts, except that contributed (or 
revalued) property is reflected at its adjusted tax basis and thereafter adjusted to reflect 
depreciation allowable for tax purposes. 
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11. A "bottom" DRO would effectively decrease X's practical 
economic risk under the DRO. Indeed, at least in a multi-
asset pmtnership, a "bottom" DRO likely would impose 
less practical economic risk on X than a "bottom" 
guarantee of a specific nonrecourse debt. A "bottom" 
guarantee of a specific debt would expose X if there is a 
decline in value of the collateral below the guaranteed 
amount. 
iii. In contrast, a "bottom" DRO would generally expose X 
only if the combined value of all assets of the partnership 
falls to below the DRO amount. The analysis is somewhat 
more complex if the partnership has secured nonrecourse 
debt. In that case, assuming the assets securing the 
nonrecourse debt have "book" value at least equal to the 
nonrecourse debt, X would only be exposed if the value of 
all partnership assets in excess of its nonrecourse debt 
declines to below the DRO amount. 
IV. In addition, a "bottom" guarantee of a specific debt could 
be called upon if there is a default under the specific debt 
that is guaranteed. This could occur even if a multi-asset 
partnership is financially healthy (if, for example, the 
specific property securing the nonrecourse debt is non-
perfonning). In contrast, a "bottom" DRO could be called 
upon only if the multi -asset partnership is actually 
liquidated, which may not occur even if the partnership 
goes into bankmptcy. 
h. Deficit Restoration Obligations, At-Risk Amounts and Hubert 
1. Background 
a) In Hubert Enterprises v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 
No.6 (September 21, 2005) ("Hubert I"), the Tax 
Court held that a deficit restoration obligation 
("DRO") imposed on the members of a limited 
liability company engaged in an equipment leasing 
business did not increase the at-risk amounts of the 
members for purposes of section 465 because, 
pursuant to the operating agreement of the limited 
liability company, the DROs were not effective 
until the members' interests in the limited liability 
company were liquidated. The taxpayer in Hubert I 
appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
While there were other issues in Hubert I that were 
on appeal to the Sixth Circuit, this outline discusses 
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only the Tax Court's and the Sixth Circuit's 
analysis and holdings with respect to the impact of a 
DRO on a limited liability company member's at-
risk amount under section 465. 
b) On April27, 2007, the Sixth Circuit found that the 
Tax Court failed to analyze whether the taxpayer 
was at risk with respect to the limited liability 
company's recourse liabilities under the applicable 
"payor of last resmi" standard. The Sixth Circuit 
vacated the Tax Court's decision in Hubert I with 
respect to the taxpayer's at-risk amount and 
remanded the case to the Tax Court for further 
proceedings. For our previous discussion of Hubert 
I and the Sixth Circuit's decision on appeal, see 
Rubin, Whiteway and Finkelstein, "Hubert 
Enterprises, Inc.: Does A Capital Account Deficit 
Restoration Obligation Increase a Partner's At-Risk 
Amount or Share of Liabilities," 9 Journal of 
Passthrough Entities No.2 (2006) ("Hubert Article 
1 "), and Rubin, Whiteway and Finkelstein, "Sixth 
Circuit Vacates Controversial Hubert Case Dealing 
with Partner's Amount at-Risk," 10 Journal of 
Passthrough Entities No. 4 (2007) ("Hubert Article 
2"). 
c) On February 28, 2008, the Tax Court issued its 
decision in Hubert Enterprises v. Commissioner, 
T.C. Memo 2008-46 (2008) ("Hube1i II"). In 
Hubert II, the Tax Court, purporting to apply an 
analysis of the "payor of last resort" standard to the 
facts at issue in Hubert I, essentially restated its 
earlier decision and concluded that the taxpayer's 
DRO did not cause the taxpayer to be considered 
the "payor oflast resort." As we have previously 
discussed, we disagree with the Tax Court's 
application of the "payor of last resort" standard. 
d) The taxpayer has not appealed Hube1i II, and the 
period for filing an appeal has expired. Rule 190 of 
the U.S. Tax Court Rules of Practice & Procedure 
(June 30, 2003) provides for a 90-day period to 
appeal a Tax Court holding. 
e) Although Hubert I and Hubert II involved members 
of a limited liability company, the Tax Court's 
holding would seem to apply equally to limited 
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partners of a limited partnership. Accordingly, 
based on the Tax Court's decision, we believe it is 
no longer advisable to use a DRO to increase a 
taxpayer's at-risk amount under section 465 with 
respect to a recourse liability of a limited liability 
company or a limited partnership. 
f) We note that Real Estate Investment Trust operating 
limited partnerships ("OP") often do not allow 
limited partners to guarantee specific partnership 
debt, but rather permit a DRO in order to protect 
limited partners from recognizing gain as a result of 
reduction in the limited partner's at-risk amount or a 
deemed distribution of cash under section 752 upon 
a contribution of encumbered property to the OP. 
In light of Hubert II, these anangements should be 
reconsidered. 
n. Hubert I 
a) Facts Related to the Members' DROs 
[i] Leasing Company LLC ("LCL"), formed in 
1998, was treated as a partnership for 
Federal income tax purposes. Hubert 
Commerce Center, Inc. ("HCC") owned 1% 
of the units ofLCL, which HCC received in 
exchange for an initial $100 capital 
contribution, and HBW, Inc. ("HBW"), 
owned 99% of the units of LCL, which 
HBW received in exchange for an initial 
$9,900 capital contribution. HBW also 
contributed all ofHBW's rights, title and 
interest in its leases, subject to existing 
loans. 
[ii] LCL was engaged in computer equipment 
leasing. LCL purchased computer 
equipment from unrelated parties. The 
purchase of the computer equipment was 
financed with debt that was partially 
recourse to the assets of LCL. 
[iii] LCL's operating agreement provided that 
"no member shall be liable as such for the 
liabilities of [LCL]." On March 28, 2001, 
the operating agreement of LCL was 
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amended and restated, effective retroactively 
to Janumy 1, 2000, to provide that "[i]f any 
partner has a deficit Capital Account 
following liquidation of his, her or its 
interest in the partnership, then he, she or it 
shall restore the amount of such deficit 
balance to the Partnership by the end of such 
taxable year or, if later, within 90 days after 
the date of such liquidation, for payment to 
creditors or distribution to Partners with 
positive capital account balances." During 
2000 and 2001, neither HBW nor HCC 
liquidated its interest in LCL and, according 
to the Tax Court, neither member had a 
deficit capital account balance. According 
to the Tax Court, from LCL's formation in 
1998 through 2001, LCL had a net loss of 
over $13.9 million. 
[iv] The members ofLCL claimed that they 
were at risk under section 465 for portions 
ofLCL's losses on account of their DROs. 
[ v] The Service argued that the DRO contained 
in the LCL operating agreement was not 
operative during the relevant years because a 
member's obligation would not be triggered 
unless such member's interest in LCL was 
liquidated. Alternatively, the Service argued 
that even if the DROs were operative, the 
members were not liable for LCL's recourse 
liabilities because a third party lender did 
not have the right to enforce the members' 
payment obligations. 
b) Tax Court's Holding in Hubert I 
[i] The Tax Court in Hubert I held that LCL's 
members were not at risk for LCL's 
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recourse obligations because the obligations 
were not personally guaranteed by the 
members and, under applicable Wyoming 
law, the members of a limited liability 
company are not personally liable for the 
debts, obligations, or liabilities of the limited 
liability company. The Tax Court stated 
that, "[b]ecause LCL's members did not 
assume personal liability for the notes, the 
members are not at risk under section 
465(b)(l)(B) and (2)(A) with respect to 
LCL's recourse obligations. Cf. Emershaw 
v. Commissioner, [91-2 USTC ~50,551], 949 
F.2d 841 (6th Cir. 1991), affg. [Dec. 
46,589(M)] T.C. Memo. 1990-246." The 
Tax Court's entire analysis with respect to 
the impact of the members' DROs on their 
at-risk amounts was limited to the following 
paragraph: 
[ii] Petitioners seek a contraty result, focusing 
on the deficit capital account restoration 
provision in section 7. 7 of the revised LCL 
operating agreement. Petitioners argue that 
this provision made LCL' s members 
personally liable for LCL's recourse 
obligations for purposes of applying the at-
risk mles. We disagree. As observed by 
respondent, section 7. 7 contains a condition 
that must be met before the deficit capital 
account restoration obligation arises. In 
accordance with that condition, an LCL 
member must first liquidate its interest in 
LCL before the member has any obligation 
to the entity. Neither HBW nor HCC 
liquidated its interest in LCL during the 
relevant years. 
[iii] Without citing any precedent regarding the 
determination of a partner's at-risk amount 
under section 465, the Tax Court in Hubert I 
held that the DROs could not put LCL's 
members at risk until their interests were 
liquidated. 
iii. Appeal to the Sixth Circuit 
a) The taxpayer appealed the Tax Court's decision to 
the Sixth Circuit, arguing that the Tax Court's 
decision in Hubert I was contrary to the Sixth 
Circuit's holding inEmershaw. See Brief for 
Petitioners-Appellants Hubeti Enterprises and 
Subsidiaries and Hubert Holding Company, 2006 
TNT 75-46 (Jan. 24, 2006). The Real Estate 
Roundtable, National Association of Real Estate 
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Investment Tmsts and National Association of 
Realtors submitted a Brief of Amici Curiae to the 
Sixth Circuit in support of reversal of the Tax 
Court's decision with respect to the impact of a 
DRO on a taxpayer's at-risk amount under section 
465. See Brief of Amici Curiae Real Estate 
Roundtable, National Association of Real Estate 
Investment Tmsts and National Association of 
Realtors In Support of Reversal In Part, 2006 TNT 
84-21 (Jan. 24, 2006). 
b) In Emershaw, the taxpayer invested in Leasing 
Equipment Associates-83 ("LEA"), which was a 
state law limited partnership engaged in an 
equipment leasing business. According to the Tax 
Court in that case, all of the partners of LEA elected 
not to be subject to subchapter K of the Code under 
section 761 for the years at issue. In addition, the 
LEA partnership agreement provided that any 
partner could withdraw from the partnership and 
receive an undivided interest in all of the 
partnership's property. The taxpayer agreed to 
assume a pro rata share of LEA's recourse note 
payable to the lessee with respect to LEA's 
purchase of its equipment. Pursuant to the 
equipment lease, the lessee was obligated to make 
payments to LEA equal to LEA's payments due 
under LEA's recourse note. In addition, the lessee's 
payments were guaranteed by the lessee's parent, 
which the Tax Court described as a good credit risk. 
The Sixth Circuit held that the taxpayer was at risk 
with respect to the taxpayer's pro rata share of the 
recourse note because the taxpayer was personally 
liable on the note and, in a worst case scenario, the 
taxpayer would be the "payor oflast resort." 
c) The taxpayer in Hubert I argued to the Sixth Circuit 
that, consistent with Emershaw, pursuant to the 
DRO contained in LCL's operating agreement, 
"with respect to LCL's recourse debt obligations, 
LCL's members are the payors of last resort" 
because "the effect of a DRO is to personally 
obligate a member to contribute funds to an entity 
when its capital account is negative." 
d) In its brief to the Sixth Circuit, the Service noted 
that the amendment to LCL's partnership agreement 
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that added the DRO, which purported to be 
effective as of Januaty 1, 2000, was not adopted 
until March 28, 2001. See Final Brief for the 
Appellee, 2006 TNT 166-25 (May 4, 2006) (the 
"Service Brief'). The Service stated that LCL's 
taxable year ends on July 29. The Service argued 
that, because the DRO was not adopted prior to 
2001, it could not be effective for any taxable year 
prior to 200 1. The Service further argued that, 
notwithstanding the existence of the DRO, the 
taxpayer was not at risk with respect to LCL' s 
recourse liabilities because, under Wyoming law, 
members of a limited liability company are not 
personally liable for the company's liabilities. In 
addition, the Service argued that taxpayer's DRO 
did not cause it to become personally liable for 
LCL's recourse liabilities because the taxpayer's 
obligations under the DRO were contingent on (1) 
the taxpayer's interest in LCL being liquidated, and 
(2) the taxpayer having a deficit capital account 
upon such a liquidation. 
e) As noted above, the Sixth Circuit found that the Tax 
Court's opinion failed to address whether the DRO 
caused LCL's members to be at-risk under the 
"payor of last resort" standard. The Sixth Circuit 
vacated the decision in Hubert I and remanded the 
case to the Tax Court for further proceedings. 
1v. Tax Court's Decision in Hubert II 
a) On remand, the Tax Court in Hubert II found that 
the DRO did not cause the members of LCL to be 
the "payors of last resort" with respect to LCL's 
recourse debt. 
b) First, the Tax Court agreed with the Service's 
argument that, because the DRO's were not added 
to the LCL partnership agreement until March 28, 
2001, the DRO was not effective for LCL's 2000 
taxable year. Section 761(c) generally provides that 
"[f]or purposes of this subchapter, a partnership 
agreement includes any modifications of the 
partnership agreement made prior to, or at, the time 
prescribed by law for the filing of the partnership 
return for the taxable year (not including 
extensions) .... " In addition, section 465(a)(l) 
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provides that a taxpayer's at-risk amount must be 
determined as of the close of the taxable year. 
Because LCL's pminershifo return for its taxable 
year ended July 31, 2000, 0 was required (absent 
extension) to be filed by November 15,2000, the 
Tax Court concluded that the amendment to the 
partnership agreement on March 28, 2001, could 
not impact LCL's members' at-risk amounts for the 
taxable year ended July 31, 2000. 11 T.C. Memo 
2008-46 at 270-271. 
c) Second, the Tax Court stated that "HBW did not 
through the DRO make an unconditional promise to 
contribute additional capital to LCL." T.C. Memo 
2008-46 at 27l.The Tax Court found that "the DRO 
contained in the LCL operating agreement requires 
that HBW contribute additional capital only if: (1) 
HBW liquidates its interest in LCL and (2) then has 
a deficit in its capital account." Id. at 271. The Tax 
Court further found that LCL's recourse creditor 
does not have a right under Wyoming law to force 
HBW to liquidate its interest in LCL in order to 
cause HBW to make an additional capital 
contribution to LCL and that, even if a liquidation 
ofHBW's interest in LCL could be compelled, 
HBW would not have to make an additional capital 
contribution unless it had a negative capital account 
as of such date. The Tax Comi stated: 
Given that the DRO requires 
additional capital contributions only 
when a member "has a deficit 
Capital Account following the 
10 We note that the Service Brief stated that LCL' s taxable year ended on July 29, 2000 
while the Tax Court stated in Hubert II that LCL's taxable year ended on July 31, 2000. 
11 Query whether, in applying section 7 61 (c) in its dete1mination of the effectiveness of an 
amendment to LCL's operating agreement in order to alter the at-risk amount of a partner for a 
taxable year, the Tax Court implicitly acknowledged that a retroactive partnership agreement 
amendment can be effective under section 465, provided the amendment is consummated on or 
before the original due date for the partnership's tax return for such year. We note that a similar 
issue arises with respect to the effect of a retroactive amendment on a partner's allocation of 
partnership liabilities under section 752 (although unlike section 465, section 752 is in the same 
subchapter as section 761(c)). 
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liquidation of * * * its interest" in 
LCL and that no creditor of LCL 
could compel a liquidation of 
HBW' s interest in LCL, we conclude 
that HBW is not a payor of last resort 
because HBW is not "personally 
liable for the repayment" of any of 
LCL' s recourse debt within the 
meaning of section 465(b )(2)(A). In 
other words, we conclude that HBW 
is not personally liable for the 
repayment of any ofLCL's recourse 
debt because HBW's obligation to 
contribute additional funds to LCL is 
not unavoidable in that HBW can 
avoid contributing additional capital 
under the DRO simply by not 
liquidating. 
Id. at273. 
d) In addition, the Tax Comi stated that the argument 
that a DRO could cause HBW to be at risk for the 
repayment ofLCL's recourse debt is "illogical" 
because "a DRO is routinely inse1ied into a 
partnership agreement to meet the substantial 
economic effect requirements of section 704(b )." 
Id. at 273. The Tax Comi concluded that, if a DRO 
caused a pminer to be at risk, then the at-risk rules 
would have little purpose because eve1y member of 
a limited liability company would then be at risk 
under section 465. Id. at 273-274. The Service 
made the same argument in the Service Brief. The 
regulations under section 704(b ), however, provide 
that partnership allocations can generally be 
respected in the absence of a DRO if the pminership 
agreement meets certain requirements. One of the 
principal requirements is that the partnership 
agreement includes a "qualified income offset" 
provision, which has the effect of allocating items 
of income to a partner to eliminate the partner's 
negative capital account. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-
l(b)(2)(ii)(d). Contrary to the Tax Court's and the 
Service's assertion, in our experience, most 
partnership agreements do not include a DRO as a 
boilerplate provision, but rather include a qualified 
income offset provision. 
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v. Analysis of the Tax Court's Holding in Hubert II 
a) As discussed above, the Tax Court in Hubert II 
focused on the need for HBW's interest in LCL to 
be liquidated in order to trigger HBW's obligation 
to make an additional capital contribution pursuant 
to the DRO. The court noted that "[t]he revised 
operating agreement states that LCL shall be 
liquidated upon is 'dissolution' and that dissolution 
occurs 'only as provided by the Wyoming LLC 
Act."' The court stated that, under Wyoming law, a 
limited liability company is dissolved upon the 
occurrence of any of the following events: 
[i] When the period fixed for the duration of the 
limited liability company shall expire; 
[ii] By the unanimous written agreement of all 
members; or 
[iii] Upon the death, retirement, resignation, 
expulsion, bankruptcy, dissolution of a 
member or occunence of any other event 
which terminates the continued membership 
of a member in the limited liability 
company, unless the business of the limited 
liability company is continued by the 
consent of all the remaining members under 
a right to do so stated in the articles of 
organization of the limited liability 
company. T.C. Memo 2008-46 at footnote 
7. 
b) The Tax Court reasoned that, because none of these 
three events would necessarily occur upon LCL' s 
default on the payment of a debt, a creditor of LCL 
could not force the liquidation ofHBW's 
membership interest in LCL or of LCL itself. The 
court stated that "LCL could not be made to 
liquidate by a creditor in any circumstance, not even 
by a creditor that forced LCL into receivership or 
bankruptcy." Id. at footnote 6. The court 
concluded that HBW therefore could not be the 
payor of last resort because HBW would simply 
choose not to liquidate its membership interest in 
order to avoid any payment obligations with respect 
to the DRO. 
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It is not self-evident to us that the Tax Court's statement 
that even a creditor who forced LCL into bankmptcy or 
receivership could not compel a liquidation, because 
Federal bankmptcy law and presumably Wyoming 
receivership law would "tmmp" the provisions ofLCL's 
operating agreement. Moreover, the regulations under 
section 704(b ), which include provisions related to deficit 
restoration obligations of partners, provide that a 
liquidation of a partner's interest in a pmtnership occurs 
upon the earlier of ( 1) the date upon which there is a 
liquidation of the pmtnership, or (2) the date upon which 
there is a liquidation of the partner's interest in the 
partnership under Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1(d). Treas. Reg. § 
1.704-1(b)(2)(g). The regulations further provide that "the 
liquidation of a pmtnership occurs upon the earlier of (3) 
the date upon which the pmtnership is terminated under 
section 708(b )(1 ), or ( 4) the date upon which the 
partnership ceases to be a going concem (even though it 
may continue in existence for the purpose of winding up its 
affairs, paying its debts, and distributing any remaining 
balance to its partners)."12 It is not clear whether the DRO 
in LCL' s partnership agreement is triggered upon a 
liquidation of LCL under state law or upon a liquidation 
within the meaning of the section 704(b) regulations. In 
our experience, the obligation to make a payment under a 
DRO is typically tied to a liquidation of a partnership 
within the meaning of the section 704(b) regulations. In 
that case, the Tax Court's concem that a creditor could not 
force a liquidation of LCL under Wyoming law such that 
HBW could simply avoid its DRO obligation by not 
causing a liquidation of its interest or LCL may be 
misplaced. Under the section 704(b) regulations, HBW's 
interest in LCL may be deemed liquidated even if LCL has 
not liquidated under Wyoming law. 
12 Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(b)(1) provides that "a partnership shall tenninate when the 
operations of the partnership are discontinued and no part of any business, financial operation, or 
venture of the partnership continues to be carried on by any of its partners in a partnership." For 
additional analysis of when a partnership terminates under section 708, see Blake D. Rubin and 
Steven B. Teplinsky, "A Comprehensive Guide to Partnership Terminations, Including the 
Impact of the New Proposed Regulations," 24 Joumal of Real Estate Taxation No.2 (Winter 
1997), and Andrea M. Whiteway and James E. Wriggelswmth, "Planning with and Around the 
Partnership Termination Rules," 65 N.Y.U. Federal Tax Institute Ch. 8 (2007). 
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c) In addition, even if the DRO contained in LCL's 
operating agreement requires a state law liquidation 
of the entity in order to be triggered, we continue to 
believe that the fact that a DRO does not become 
operative until the member's interest in the entity is 
liquidated should not preclude a finding that the 
DRO increases the member's at-risk amount prior 
to liquidation. As we have previously argued, in 
detetmining whether a member of a limited liability 
company is at risk under section 465 for a state law 
recourse liability, we believe the Tax Court should 
have adopted an approach similar to that contained 
in the regulations under section 7 52 with respect to 
the allocation of partnership recourse liabilities. As 
discussed below, these regulations allocate 
partnership recourse debt to the partner that bears 
the economic risk of loss for the debt. 
d) Section 465- Generally 
[i] Section 465(a) generally provides that, in 
the case of an individual and cetiain closely 
held corporations, any loss from an activity 
for the taxable year shall be allowed only to 
the extent of the aggregate amount with 
respect to which the taxpayer is at risk at the 
close of the taxable year. Section 465(e)(l) 
provides that if a taxpayer's at-risk amount 
is reduced below zero then losses previously 
allowed for a taxable year to which the mles 
apply are recaptured to the extent of the 
negative amount. 
[ii] Section 465(b) provides that a taxpayer is 
considered at risk to the extent of any money 
contributed to an activity by the taxpayer, 
and with respect to any money borrowed by 
the taxpayer to be used in the activity, to the 
extent that the taxpayer is personally liable 
for repayment, subject to cetiain exceptions. 
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.465-6( d) provides that 
if a taxpayer guarantees repayment of an 
amount borrowed by another person for use 
in an activity, the guarantee does not 
increase the taxpayer's at-risk amount. If 
the taxpayer repays to the creditor the 
amount borrowed by the primary obligor, 
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the taxpayer's at-risk amount is increased 
when the taxpayer has no remaining legal 
rights against the primmy obligor. In 
contrast, Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.465-24 
provides that, when a partnership incurs a 
state law recourse liability, each partner's at-
risk amount is increased to the extent the 
partner is not protected against loss. Under 
this proposed regulation, the increase in the 
partner's at-risk amount is effective prior to 
the time the partner makes any actual 
payments with respect to the debt. These 
proposed regulations, which were proposed 
in 1979, were never adopted as final 
regulations. 
[iii] The case law analyzing the application of 
section 465 to partnerships generally follows 
the approach of Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.465-
24 in that it allows a pattner's at-risk amount 
to be increased prior to the time the partner 
makes an actual payment. In Abramson v. 
Commissioner, 86 T.C. 360 (1986), the 
limited partners of a partnership guaranteed 
the nonrecourse debt of the partnership. The 
Tax Court held that the each of the limited 
pattners could increase their bases in the 
pattnership by the amount of the 
partnership's nonrecourse debt guaranteed 
by each partner, notwithstanding the fact 
that the limited partners may never actually 
make a payment under their guarantees. 
Specifically, the Tax Court stated that: 
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[t]he guarantee of an 
otherwise nonrecourse note 
places each guaranteeing 
partner in an economic 
position indistinguishable 
from that of a general pattner 
with liability under a recourse 
note except that the 
guaranteeing partner's 
liability is limited to the 
amount guaranteed .... Each 
is obligated to use his 
personal assets to satisfy pro 
rata the partnership liability .. 
. Economic reality dictates 
that [the general partner and 
limited partners] be treated 
equally, and we so hold. 
Abramson, 86 T.C. at 374. 
[iv] Further, the Tax Court held that, because the 
limited partners were personally and directly 
liable for the partnership's nomecourse debt, 
the limited partners were at risk for such 
amount under section 465. Thus, the Tax 
Court concluded that the guarantee 
increased the guaranteeing partners at-risk 
amount even though the guarantee had not 
yet been called and the guaranteeing 
partners had not yet made any payment. 
[ v] Similarly, in Gefen v. Commissioner, 87 
T.C. 1471 (1986), a limited partner in a 
partnership engaged in a computer 
equipment leasing business guaranteed a 
recourse debt of the partnership and was 
obligated under the partnership agreement to 
make a "special contribution," equal to the 
limited partner's payment obligation under 
the guarantee, to the partnership in the event 
of a default by the partnership under the 
recourse liability. The limited partner had 
no right to reimbursement from either the 
partnership or the general partners for any 
amount paid by the limited partner with 
respect to the guarantee or the special 
contribution obligation. The Tax Court held 
that the limited partner could include the 
guaranteed amount of the partnership's 
recourse debt in her basis under section 752. 
In addition, the Tax Court stated that 
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petitioner was not a mere 
guarantor of her pro rata 
portion of the Partnership's 
recourse indebtedness, but 
was ultimately liable for it, 
because there was no primary 
obligor against whom she had 
a remedy to recover amounts 
paid by her to Sun Life 
pursuant to the Limited 
Partner Guarantee or to the 
Partnership as a Special 
Contribution .... Petitioner 
was therefore at risk within 
the meaning of section 465 
for the full amount of her pro 
rata share of the Partnership's 
recourse indebtedness to Sun 
Life. 
Gefen, 87 T.C. at 1500-1501. 
[vi] In Melvin v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 63 
(1987), aff'd, 894 F. 2d 1072, 65 AFTR2d 
90-508 (9th Cir. 1990), the Tax Court stated 
that "[i]t cannot seriously be questioned that 
debt obligations of a pmtnership that are 
payable in later years generally are to be 
included in the at-risk amounts of the 
partners that are personally liable therefore. 
Sec. 465(b )(2)(A). The proposed 
regulations under section 465 and final 
regulations under section 752 contemplate 
that obligations due in later years will be 
included in the computation of a partner's 
at-risk amount and in the computation of his 
basis." Melvin, 88 T.C. at 73. The Tax 
Comt further explained that, in determining 
whether a pattner is at risk for a partnership 
liability, "[t]he relevant question is who, if 
anyone, will ultimately be obligated to pay 
the pmtnership's recourse obligations if the 
partnership is unable to do so. It is not 
relevant that the pa1tnership may be able to 
do so. The scenario that controls is the 
worst-case scenario, not the best case ... 
The critical inquily should be who is the 
obligor oflast resort .... " Id. at 75. 
[vii] InPritchettv. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 581 
(1985), rev'd and remanded, 827 F.2d 644 
(9th Cir. 1987), a limited partnership 
executed a recourse note in connection with 




partners were personally liable under the 
note. The limited partnership agreement, 
however, provided that, in the event the note 
was not paid in full at maturity, the limited 
partners would be personally obligated, if 
called upon by the general partners, to make 
additional capital contributions to the 
partnership sufficient to repay the note in 
full. The Tax Comi found that the limited 
partners incuned no personal liability to the 
creditor as a result of their capital 
contribution obligations and that the limited 
partners' obligations were contingent on a 
default on the note and on a cash capital call 
by the general partners. As a result, the Tax 
Comi held that the limited partners were not 
at risk with respect to the recourse note 
under section 465. Pritchett, 85 T.C. at 589. 
While the Ninth Circuit agreed that the 
limited partners were not personally liable to 
the creditor, the Ninth Circuit reversed the 
Tax Court, holding that the critical inquiry 
under section 465 is who is the obligor of 
last resmi. The Ninth Circuit found that the 
limited partners' capital contribution 
obligations under the partnership agreement 
made them ultimately responsible for the 
debt, and, in accordance with Melvin, that 
"economic reality" dictated that the general 
partners would make the cash capital calls if 
the partnership's assets were insufficient to 
satisfy the debt. Pritchett, 827 F.2d at 647. 
Finally, in Pledger v. Commissioner, 236 F. 
3d 315 (6th Cir. 2000), a case decided in the 
same Federal appellate circuit as Hubert, the 
taxpayer purchased an interest in a trust 
fmmed by a corporation ("Corporation A") 
that had purchased satellite transponders 
pursuant to a three-patty sale-leaseback 
transaction. Corporation A was a brother-
sister corporation to the lessee of the 
transponders under a master-lease 
agreement. Corporation A transfened its 
interest in the transponders to the trust and 
offered units in the trust to third-party 
investors, including the taxpayer. In 
connection with the taxpayer's purchase of 
an interest in the trust, the taxpayer gave a 
promiss01y note to Corporation A, pursuant 
to which the taxpayer agreed to pay its pro 
rata share of the payments due from 
Corporation A to the lessee. The payments 
due to the lessee from Corporation A were 
equal to the payments due from the lessee to 
the trust under the master lease. The 
payments received by the trust from the 
lessee were applied to satisfy the payments 
the taxpayer was required to make under the 
promissory note. In addition, the lessee's 
obligations under the lease were guaranteed 
by the lessee's and Corporation A's parent 
corporation ("Parent"). The Sixth Circuit 
found that Corporation A was a mere 
instrumentality of Parent and that Parent was 
both the guarantor and payee under the sale-
leaseback arrangement. As a result, the 
Sixth Circuit held that the taxpayer was not 
at risk with respect to the promissory note 
because, even if the lessee became insolvent, 
the taxpayer's obligations under the 
promissory note would be cancelled out by 
Parent's guaranty oflessee's obligations. 
The Sixth Circuit explained that it applies 
the "payor of last resort" test to determine 
whether a taxpayer will suffer an economic 
loss with respect to a transaction. Similar to 
the analysis applied in Abramson, Gefen, 
Melvin, and Pritchett, under this test the 
Sixth Circuit "asks whether, in a worst case 
scenario, the individual taxpayer will suffer 
any personal, out-of-pocket expenses." 
Pledger, 236 F.3d at 319. 
[ix] Thus, provided that the taxpayer is the 
obligor of last resort in a worst-case scenario 
in the event funds generated in the activity 
are insufficient to repay the debt, and has no 
rights of indemnification, contribution or 
subrogation against any other person, the 
taxpayer is at risk for the amount of the debt. 
See also Whitmire v. Commissioner, 178 
F.3d 1050, 1053 (91h Cir. 1999) (stating that, 
for purposes of section 465, a taxpayer is 
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personally liable for a liability if the 
"taxpayer would legally be responsible for 
his debt under a worst-case scenario" (citing 
American Principals Leasing Corporation v. 
United States, 904 F.2d 477, 482 (9111 Cir. 
1990))); Tepper v. Commissioner, 62 T.C.M. 
505, 509 (1991), (holding that a taxpayer is 
personally liable for the repayment of an 
amount under section 465(b )(2)(A) if the 
taxpayer has ultimate liability to repay the 
debt obligation); FSA 200025018 (March 
17, 2000) (concluding that a member of a 
limited liability company that guaranteed a 
lease obligation of the limited liability 
company should be considered at risk with 
respect to such liability under section 465 
because "[a] partner who, through a 
contractual obligation, has ultimate 
responsibility for the debt is at-risk with 
respect to such amount"). 
e) Risk of Loss Under Section 752 Regulations 
[i] Similar to section 465, section 752(a) 
provides that a partnership liability is a 
recourse liability to the extent that any 
partner or related person 13 bears the 
"economic risk of loss" for that liability 
under the deemed liquidation analysis 
described above. 
[ii] Accordingly, like section 465, the section 
752 regulations employ a worst-case 
scenario approach to determine whether a 
partner is "at risk" with respect to a 
partnership recourse liability. In fact, in the 
past, the Service has acknowledged that the 
recourse debt allocation rules under section 
13 Treas. Reg. § 1. 7 52-4(b) generally provides that a person is related to a partner if the 
person and partner bear a relationship to each other that is specified in section 267(b) or section 
707(b )(1), subject to the following modifications: (1) substitute "80 percent or more" for "more 
than 50 percent" each place it appears in those sections; (2) a person's family is determined by 
excluding brothers and sisters; and (3) disregard section 267(e)(l) and section 267(f)(l)(A). 
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752 should be applied to determine a 
partner's at-risk amount with respect to such 
liabilities under section 465. See FSA 0293 
(December 15, 2003) (concluding that 
liability assumption agreements entered into 
by limited partners of a partnership caused 
the partners to have DROs that increased the 
partners' bases in their partnership interests 
under section 752(a) and increased their at-
risk amounts under section 465); FSA 0623 
(June 21, 1993) (concluding that limited 
partners' conditional obligations to make 
additional capital contributions in the event 
the partnership is unable to meet its debt 
service obligations increase the limited 
partners' bases under section 752(a) and 
their at-risk amounts under section 465 and 
stating that, "the likelihood that the call will 
be made or repaid is not the standard under 
section 465 ... [r]ather, the test is whether, 
under a worst case scenario analysis, the 
partner will ultimately be liable"); Priv. Ltr. 
Rul. 9036013 (applying the economic risk of 
loss analysis under the temporary 
regulations under section 752 to determine a 
partner's at-risk amount under section 465). 
[iii] In addition, the section 752 regulations 
provide that, in determining whether a 
partner or related person has an obligation to 
make a payment in the event of a deemed 
liquidation of the partnership as described 
above, all statutory and contractual 
obligations relating to the partnership 
liability are taken into account, including 
obligations to the partnership that are 
imposed by the partnership agreement, such 
as the obligation to make a capital 
contribution and to restore a deficit capital 
account upon liquidation of the partnership. 
As we have previously discussed, a DRO 
should generally be effective to cause a 
limited partner to bear the economic risk of 
loss within the meaning of the section 752 
regulations with respect to a recourse debt of 
a limited partnership. In contrast, whether a 
member of a limited liability company is 
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deemed to bear the economic risk of loss for 
a recourse debt of a limited liability 
company may depend on whether a member 
has a positive or negative "book" capital 
account with respect to their membership 
interest in the limited liability company. See 
Hubert Article 1 and Hubert Article 2, 
supra. 
f) Thus, we continue to believe that, consistent with 
case law precedent under section 465, Prop. Treas. 
Reg. § 1.465-24 and the section 752 regulations and 
as a matter of sound tax policy, a DRO should 
attract an allocation of pminership recourse debt 
under section 752 and should also increase a 
pminer's at-risk amount under section 465 to the 
extent that the DRO would require the partner to 
make a payment in the event of a deemed 
liquidation. Unfortunately, however, the Tax Court 
disagreed with this conclusion in Hubert II. 
Vl. Conclusion 
a) In applying the "payor oflast resort" test as 
mandated by the Sixth Circuit, we believe the Tax 
Court should have determined whether the DRO 
would have obligated the members ofLCL to make 
a payment upon a constructive liquidation of LCL 
under an analysis that is consistent with recourse 
liability allocation methodology contained in the 
regulations under section 752. 
b) In addition, as noted above, we believe the Tax 
Court's emphasis on the inability of a creditor to 
force a state law liquidation of LCL may have been 
misplaced in light of the definition of the phrase 
"liquidation of a partnership" in the section 704(b) 
regulations. 
c) Although Hubert II involved the at-risk amounts of 
members of a limited liability company, we believe 
the Tax Court's holding applies equally to a limited 
partnership. 
d) Accordingly, in light of Hubert II, it is inadvisable 
for a limited liability company member or limited 
partner to enter into a DRO to increase such 
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member's or limited partner's at-risk amount under 
section 465 with respect to a recourse liability. 
i. Example 9: Nomecourse Debt; Conventional DRO. The facts are 
the same as the facts in Example 7, except that the debt is 
nomecourse. 
1. Tax Consequences. X's DRO will not cause $10 of debt to 
be allocated to X. Upon a constmctive liquidation of the 
partnership, the partnership would be deemed to dispose of 
the Property in a fully taxable transaction for consideration 
equal to the $100 nomecourse liability. The partnership 
would recognize $20 of gain on the disposition. Under the 
"minimum gain charge back" requirement of the section 
704(b) regulations, the $20 gain would be allocated $ .20 to 
X and $19.80 to the other partners. See 
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(£). After this allocation, X's capital 
account would be $0. Because X would not have a deficit 
capital account balance, the DRO would not apply. 
Accordingly, X would not be required to make a capital 
contribution to the partnership, and X would not bear the 
economic risk of loss with respect to any portion of the 
debt. 
3. Managing Liability Allocations in Limited Liability Companies 
a. Characterization of a Recourse Liability of a Limited Liability 
Company. 
1. A fundamental state law difference between LLCs that are 
treated as partnerships for Federal income tax purposes and 
patinerships is that, in an LLC, by operation of state law, 
no member is liable for obligations of the LLC merely by 
virtue of being a member in the LLC. In contrast, in a 
partnership, a general partner is liable for debts of the 
partnership unless the debt by its terms relieves the general 
patiner from liability (i.e., the debt is nomecourse from a 
state law perspective). This fundamental difference creates 
important differences in the way the mles of section 752 
apply to LLCs compared to partnerships. 
ii. Absent special circumstances, a liability that is recourse 
from a state law perspective to an LLC nevertheless should 
be treated as nomecourse for purposes of section 752. This 
is because, by virtue of the liability shield that the LLC 
provides, no member is personally obligated to pay the 
liability. The creditor can reach any and all of the assets of 
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the LLC, but if those assets are insufficient to pay the 
liability, the creditor cannot pursue the members 
personally. 
111. Such a liability is much like a so-called "exculpatory 
liability" in a partnership, i.e., a liability with respect to 
which the creditor can reach all assets of the patinership but 
with respect to which all partners are exculpated from 
personal liability. See T.D. 8385, 1992-1 C.B. 199. 
b. Guarantee 
1. Recourse Liability. A recourse liability of an LLC should 
be treated as nonrecourse for section 752 purposes. As is 
the case with respect to nonrecourse liabilities of 
partnerships, an enforceable guarantee ("bottom" or 
othetwise) of all or a portion of such liability, with waiver 
of any right of subrogation, should cause the guaranteeing 
member to bear the economic risk of loss for the 
guaranteed portion. See discussion in Example 3, above. 
11. Nonrecourse Liability. A similar result should apply with 
respect to a liability of an LLC that is nonrecourse under 
state law (i.e., a liability with respect to which the lender's 
right to enforce payment is limited to specified collateral). 
c. Deficit Restoration Obligation 
1. Recourse Debt. Whether a DRO attracts an allocation of 
state law recourse debt for a member of an LLC may 
depend on whether the member has a positive or negative 
"book" capital account, as shown in Example 10 and 
Example 11 below. 
a) Example 10- LLC Members with Negative Capital 
Accounts. The facts are the same as the facts in 
Example 7, except that the entity is an LLC rather 
than a partnership. 
[i] Tax Consequences. X's DRO will not cause 
$10 of debt to be allocated to X. Upon a 
constructive liquidation of a partnership, 
Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-l(b)(l)(iii) specifies that 
"[t]he partnership disposes of all of its 
property in a fully taxable transaction for no 
consideration (except relief from liabilities 
for which the creditor's right to repayment is 
limited solely to one or more assets of the 
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partnership.)" In the case of state law 
recourse debt of an LLC, the creditor's right 
to repayment is not limited to a specified 
subset ofLLC assets; rather, the creditor 
may pursue all assets of the partnership but 
may not enforce the debt against the 
members personally. Nevertheless, the 
creditor's right to repayment is limited 
"solely to one or more assets of the 
partnership" because that phrase 
encompasses the situation where the 
creditor's right to repayment is limited to all 
assets of the LLC. 
[ii] Thus, upon a constructive liquidation, the 
LLC would be deemed to dispose of the 
Property in a fully taxable transaction for 
consideration equal to the $100 liability. 
The LLC would recognize $20 of gain on 
the disposition. Under the "minimum gain 
charge back" requirement of the section 
704(b) regulations, the $20 gain would be 
allocated$ .20 to X and $19.80 to the other 
members. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(f). 
After this allocation, X' s capital account 
would be $0. Because X would not have a 
deficit capital account balance, the DRO 
would not apply. Accordingly, X would not 
be obligated to make a capital contribution 
to the LLC, and X would not bear the 
economic risk of loss with respect to any 
portion of the debt. 14 
b) Example 11 - LLC Members with Positive Capital 
Accounts. The facts are the same as the facts in 
Example 10, except the "book" balance sheet of the 
LLC is as follows: 
14 See generally Stan, Case, Gane-Lohnes, Rosenberg, Schmalz, 725-2nd T.M., Limited 
Liability Companies, Section IV.B.2.b.(3) ("It is unclear whether a DRO shifts economic risk of 
loss for an LLC's recourse debt ... "). 
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Property 120 100 Liability 
.20 X 
19.80 Other Partners 
[i] Tax Consequences. For the reasons 
discussed in Example 11, upon a 
constructive liquidation, the LLC would be 
deemed to dispose of the Property in a fully 
taxable transaction for consideration equal 
to the $100 liability. The LLC would 
recognize $20 of loss on the disposition. Of 
this amount, $10.20 would be allocated to X 
and the balance would be allocated to the 
other partners. After these allocations, X 
would have a deficit capital account of $10, 
and would be required to contribute this 
amount to the LLC. The other members 
would have positive capital accounts of $10. 
X' s $10 would either be distributed to the 
other partners in liquidation or would be 
paid to the creditor. See generally 
Treas. Reg.§ 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(c), which 
states that the proceeds of a DRO are to "be 
paid to creditors of the partnership or 
distributed to other partners in accordance 
with their positive capital account balances." 
[ii] Note that under the language of the 
constructive liquidation test, the assumption 
that all assets of the LLC are worth zero 
applies with respect to assets that are 
presumed transferred to the creditor on 
account of the debt. Thus, because the 
creditor's rights are not extinguished, in 
applying the constructive liquidation test the 
creditor should be presumed to pursue the 
$10. 
[iii] Regardless ofwhether the proceeds of the 
$10 DRO are deemed to be distributed to the 
other members or paid to creditors, because 
X would be required to make a capital 
contribution, X should bear the economic 
risk of loss with respect to $10. 
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Accordingly, $10 of the debt would be 
allocated to X. 
[iv] Note, however, that in order for a partner to 
bear the economic risk of loss with respect 
to a liability, Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(1) 
requires that the partner "be obligated to 
make a payment to any person (or a 
contribution to the partnership) because that 
liability becomes due and payable .... " To 
the extent that X's $10 capital contribution 
would be distributed to other members 
rather than paid to creditors, it is possible 
that the Service would argue that this 
requirement is not met. 
d. Capital Contribution Obligation Tied to Value. In light of the 
uncertainty as to whether a DRO will attract an allocation of state 
law recourse debt for a member of an LLC, Example 12 illustrates 
a better way to attract a debt allocation from an LLC. 
i. Example 12- LLC Member with Negative Capital 
Account. Assume the same facts in Example 10, except 
that instead of entering into a DRO, X agrees that, upon 
liquidation of the LLC, to the extent that the fair market 
value of the assets available to satisfy the $100 debt are less 
than $10, X will make a capital contribution ofup to $10 
itTespective of whether X has a deficit capital account 
balance. 
a) Tax Consequences. X's capital contribution 
obligation should cause $10 of the debt to be 
allocated to X. As discussed in Example 10, upon a 
constructive liquidation, the LLC would be deemed 
to dispose of the Property in a fully taxable 
transaction for consideration equal to the $100 
liability. The LLC would recognize $20 of gain on 
the disposition. Under the "minimum gain 
chargeback" requirement of the section 704(b) 
regulations, the $20 gain would be allocated $ .20 to 
X and $19.80 to the other members. See 
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(£). After this allocation, X's 
capital account would be $0. 
b) Even though X would not have a deficit capital 
account balance, X would be obligated to make a 
capital contribution to the LLC. 
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Treas. Reg. § 1. 752-2(b )(1 )(ii) specifies that, upon a 
constmctive liquidation, "[ w ]ith the exception of 
property contributed to secure a partnership liability 
(see§ 1.752-2(h)(2)) all of the partnership's assets, 
including cash, have a value of zero .... " If the 
Property were worth zero, X would be obligated to 
make a $10 capital contribution to the LLC, and the 
creditor would be able to recover this amount 
(because the creditor would have recourse against 
all assets of the LLC). Moreover, 
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b )(3)(ii) specifies that, in 
determining whether a partner bears the economic 
risk of loss, obligations imposed by the patinership 
agreement are taken into account, "including the 
obligation to make a capital contribution and to 
restore a deficit capital account upon liquidation ... 
. " [Emphasis added.] Accordingly, X bears the 
economic risk of loss for $10 and is allocated $10 of 
the debt. 
C. TREATMENT OF "NON-TAX BASIS" LIABILITIES: REG.§§ 1.752-6 AND 
1.752-7 
1. Background. On June 23, 2003, the Service issued temporary and 
proposed regulations addressing the treatment of cetiain contractual and 
other obligations assumed by a partnership that historically have not been 
treated as "liabilities" for purposes of section 752 and the regulations 
thereunder. The proposed and temporary regulations were a response to 
perceived abuses that originated in the corporate area but then migrated to 
the patinership context. 
a. Corporate Abuse and Section 358(h) 
1. On December 21,2000, as part of the Community Renewal 
Tax Relief Act of 2000 (the "Act"), Congress enacted 
section 358(h) aimed at curbing the following perceived 
abuse. A corporation would assume an obligation of a 
taxpayer who took the position that the obligation was not a 
liability within the meaning of section 357( c) and thus did 
not reduce the taxpayer's basis in the stock of the 
corporation. The transferor would then sell the stock of the 
corporation for a low amount, reflecting the existence of 
the obligation, and claim a loss, even though the taxpayer 
had not incuned any conesponding economic loss. When 
the corporation paid the obligation, it deducted the 
payment. Thus, the transferor was able to effectively 
duplicate a loss in corporate stock and accelerate 
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deductions that are only allowed upon economic 
performance of an obligation. 
11. To prevent this perceived abuse, section 358(h)(l) provides 
that after application of section 3 58( d), the basis in stock 
received in an exchange to which section 351, 354, 355, 
356, or 361 applies must be reduced (but not below the fair 
market value of the stock) by the amount of any liability 
assumed in the exchange. For this purpose, section 
358(h)(3) defines the tenn "liability" to include any fixed 
or contingent obligation to make payment without regard to 
whether the obligation is othetwise taken into account for 
purposes of the Code. Section 358(h)(2) provides 
exceptions to the basis reduction requirement if: (1) the 
trade or business with which the liability is associated is 
transferred to the person assuming the liability as pali of 
the exchange; or (2) substantially all of the assets with 
which the liability is associated are transferred to the 
person assuming the liability as part of the exchange. 
b. Partnership Abuse 
1. The Service tried to prevent similar abuses in the 
partnership context tln·ough the issuance of administrative 
guidance. On September 5, 2000, the Service issued Notice 
2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255, identifying the so-called "Son 
ofBoss" transaction as a "listed transaction." The fact 
pattern discussed in Notice 2000-44 involves a taxpayer 
that contributes a purchased option to a partnership and 
writes an option that is assumed by the partnership. The 
taxpayer takes the position that its basis in its palinership 
interest is increased by the cost of the purchased call option 
but is not reduced under section 752 for the assumption of 
the written call option obligation. Thereafter, upon a 
disposition of the partnership interest for a low amount, 
reflecting the existence of the written call option, the 
taxpayer claims a loss even though the taxpayer has not 
incurred any corresponding economic loss. 
ii. The taxpayer's position was based on the conclusion that 
the obligation assumed does not constitute a liability for 
purposes of section 752. Section 752(a) and (b) provide 
that when a palinership assumes a liability from a paliner 
or a paliner contributes property to a palinership subject to 
a liability, the paliner will be treated as receiving a deemed 
distribution of money from the palinership to the extent of 
the difference between the amount of the liability and the 
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partner's share of such liability after the partnership's 
assumption of the liability. Pursuant to section 733, the 
partner's basis in the partnership interest is reduced by the 
amount of the deemed distribution of money, and pursuant 
to section 731, the partner may recognize gain as a result of 
the deemed distribution to the extent that it exceeds the 
patiner's basis in the partnership interest. 
111. The Code does not contain a definition of "liability" for 
purposes of section 752. However, case law and revenue 
rulings generally have established that for this purpose, the 
term "liability" includes an obligation only if and to the 
extent that incurring the obligation creates or increases the 
basis to the partnership of any of the partnership's assets 
(including cash attributable to borrowings), gives rise to an 
immediate deduction to the partnership, or, under section 
705(a)(2)(B), currently decreases a partner's basis in the 
partner's partnership interest. See Rev. Rul. 88-77, 1988-2 
C.B. 128; Salina Partnership LP, FPL Group, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2000-352. Thus, the te1m 
"liability" for purposes of section 752 generally has not 
included an obligation the payment of which would give 
rise to a deduction. 
IV. During the course of enacting section 358(h) to preclude 
the abuse in the corporate context, Congress became aware 
that taxpayers were attempting to use partnerships to 
engage in similarly abusive transactions. Accordingly, in 
Section 309(c) of the Act, Congress directed the Secretary 
to prescribe rules to provide "appropriate adjustments 
under subchapter K of chapter 1 of the Code to prevent the 
acceleration or duplication of losses through the 
assumption of (or transfer of assets subject to) liabilities 
described in section 358(h)(3) ... in transactions involving 
partnerships." Section 358(h)(3) defines the term 
"liability" to include any fixed or contingent obligation to 
make payment without regard to whether the obligation is 
othetwise taken into account for purposes of the Code. The 
regulations issued pursuant to this directive are to apply to 
assumptions of liabilities that occur after October 18, 1999, 
or such later date as may be prescribed in the regulations. 
Act Section 309( d)(2). 
v. In contrast to the corporate abuse targeted by section 
358(h), in the partnership context, the duplication of the 
loss may be viewed as only temporary. For example, if a 
taxpayer transfers assets with an adjusted basis and fair 
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market value of $100 to a partnership in exchange for a 
partnership interest, and the partnership assumes a $40 
liability that is not deductible until paid, the taxpayer's 
interest in the partnership would have a value of $60 and a 
basis of $100. Upon the sale of the partnership interest, the 
taxpayer would claim a $40 loss, in effect accelerating the 
deduction for the $40 liability. Assuming no election under 
section 754 (note that these regulations were issued before 
enactment of the Jobs Act provisions making certain 
downward basis adjustments under section 743(b) 
mandatmy), the partnership would continue to have a $100 
adjusted basis in the contributed asset. If the partnership 
thereafter satisfied the liability and allocated the $40 
deduction to the purchaser, the loss would be duplicated. 
The purchaser's adjusted basis in the partnership would 
initially be its $60 purchase price, but would be reduced to 
$20 by the $40 allocated deduction. Thus, if the 
partnership was thereafter liquidated and the purchaser 
received the $60 value of its partnership interest in cash, 
the purchaser would recognize $40 of gain under section 
731(a). 
2. The Final Regulations. On May 26, 2005, the Service issued final 
regulations in response to the directive from Congress. The final 
regulations generally follow the temporary and proposed regulations 
issued on June 23, 2003, with certain modifications. In addition, the 
Service issued regulations under section 358(h) for assumptions of 
liabilities by corporations from partners and partnerships. These 
regulations are intended to prevent the duplication and acceleration of 
noneconomic tax losses resulting from Son of Boss and similar 
transactions, but they sweep much more broadly. 
a. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-6 
i. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-6 applies retroactively to transactions 
occuning after October 18, 1999, and before June 24, 2003. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-6 generally adopts the approach of 
section 358(h) for transactions involving partnership 
assumptions of partners' liabilities occuning during that 
time window, but modifies the approach of section 358(h) 
as necessary to apply the rules to partnerships instead of 
corporations. 
n. Under Treas. Reg. § 1.752-6, if a partnership assumes a 
liability of a partner (other than a liability to which section 
752(a) and (b) apply) in a transaction described in section 
72l(a), then, after application of section 752(a) and (b), 
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there is an automatic reduction in the partner's basis in the 
partnership (but not below the "adjusted value" of such 
interest) by the amount (determined as of the date of the 
exchange) of the liability. 
111. Treas. Reg. § 1. 7 52-6 defines "liability" consistently with 
section 358(h) to include any fixed or contingent obligation 
to make payment, without regard to whether the obligation 
is otherwise taken into account for federal tax purposes. 
1v. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-6 defines the "adjusted value" of a 
partner's interest in a partnership as the fair market value of 
that interest increased by the partner's share of partnership 
liabilities under Treas. Reg. §§ 1.752-1 through 1.752-5. 
v. Thus, under section 752(d), the "adjusted value" should 
equal the amount that would be the partner's "amount 
realized" under section 1001(b) if there were a taxable 
disposition of the partnership interest immediately after the 
assumption of the liability. As a result, if the partner sold 
the interest immediately after the liability was assumed, no 
loss could be recognized. 
vi. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-6 adopts by cross reference the 
exceptions to the automatic basis reduction set forth under 
section 358(h). Treas. Reg. § 1.752-6(b)(1). Thus, there is 
no reduction in a partner's basis if: (1) the trade or business 
with which the liability is associated is transferred to the 
partnership assuming the liability as part of the transaction, 
or (2) substantially all of the assets with which the liability 
is associated are contributed to the partnership assuming 
the liability. Section 358(h)(2). 
vn. The temporary regulations provide that the exception for 
contributions of substantially all of the assets with which 
the liability is associated does not apply in the case of a 
partnership transaction described in Notice 2000-44, or a 
partnership transaction that is substantially similar to the 
transactions described in Notice 2000-44. Treas. Reg. § 
1.752-6(b )(2). 
b. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-7 
1. Treas. Reg. § 1. 7 52-7 generally applies prospectively to 
transactions occurring after June 23, 2003, unless a 
taxpayer to which Treas. Reg. § 1.752-6 would otherwise 
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apply elects to apply the provisions ofTreas. Reg.§ 1.752-
7 to the transaction at issue. 
ii. Liability Defined. The regulations provide a definition of 
"liability" for purposes of section 752 and provides that an 
obligation is a liability if and to the extent that incuning the 
obligation --
a) creates or increases the basis of any of the obligor's 
assets (including cash); 
b) gives rise to an immediate deduction to the obligor; 
or 
c) gives rise to an expense that is not deductible in 
computing the obligor's taxable income and is not 
properly chargeable to capital. 
An "obligation" is any fixed or contingent obligation to 
make payment without regard to whether the obligation is 
otherwise taken into account for purposes of the Code. 
Obligations include, but are not limited to, debt obligations, 
envirollll1ental obligations, tort obligations, contract 
obligations, pension obligations, obligations under a short 
sale, and obligations under derivative fmancial instruments 
such as options, forward contracts, and futures contracts. 
Thus, an "obligation" the incunence of which creates or 
increases basis, give rise to an immediate deduction or 
gives rise to a non-deductible, non-capitalizable expense is 
treated as a liability. 
111. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-7 Liability. The regulations are 
intended to prevent the acceleration or duplication of loss 
through the assumption of obligations not described in 
Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-l(a). The regulations refer to any such 
obligation as a "Reg.§ 1.752-7liability" and to the partner 
transfening such liability as a "Reg. § 1. 7 52-7 liability 
partner." Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-7(b)(3) and (5). The final 
regulations clarify that a liability can be a liability 
described in Treas. Reg. § 1.752-l(a) in part and a Reg. 
§ 1.752-7liabilityinpart. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-7(b)(3). 
Any person who acquires a partnership interest from a Reg. 
§ 1. 7 52-7 liability partner in a transaction in which the 
transferee's basis in the partnership interest is determined 
in whole or in part by reference to the transferor's basis is 
also a Reg. § 1.752-7liability partner. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-
7(b)(5); Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-7(e)(3). 
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a) The regulations do not explicitly address whether an 
obligation under a short sale constitutes a liability or 
a Reg. § 1. 752-7 liability. Arguably, the duty to 
retum stock borrowed to consummate a short sale is 
the "obligation" under the regulations and does not, 
in and of itself, give rise to any cash proceeds or 
basis in any property. Rather, the sale of the 
borrowed stock gives rise to the cash proceeds but 
is independent of the bono wing of the stock. 
Nevertheless, prior to the issuance of the 
regulations, Salina Partnership v. Commissioner, 
T.C. Memo 2000-352, held that a short sale gave 
rise to a liability for purposes of section 752. 
Moreover, the Service reached the same conclusion 
in Rev. Rul. 95-26, 1995-1 C.B. 131, and informal 
discussions with representatives of the Service who 
were involved in the development of the regulations 
indicate that a short sale is intended to give rise to a 
liability in an amount equal to the cash proceeds 
from the sale. 
b) The regulations also do not specifically address 
whether a variable share prepaid forward contract is 
a "liability" or even an "obligation." An example of 
such an anangement is set forth in Rev. Rul. 2003-
7, 2003-5 I.R.B. 363. 
[i] In that mling, Shareholder, an individual, 
owned common stock of Y Corporation, 
which was publicly traded. The shares had a 
value of $20 per share and Shareholder's 
basis was less than $20. Shareholder 
entered into an arm's length agreement (the 
"Agreement") with Investment Bank, and 
received $z of cash upon execution of the 
Agreement. In retum, Shareholder became 
obligated to deliver to Investment Ban1c on 
the third anniversary of the Agreement (the 
"Exchange Date") a number of shares of 
common stock ofY corporation to be 
determined by formula. Under the formula, 
if the market price of a share of Y 
Corporation common stock is less than $20 
on the Exchange Date, Investment Bank will 
receive 100 shares of common stock. If the 
market price of a share is at least $20 and no 
more than $25 on the Exchange Date, 
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Investment Banlc will receive a number of 
shares having a total market value equal to 
$2,000. If the market price of a share 
exceeds $25 on the Exchange Date, 
Investment Banlc will receive 80 shares of 
common stock. In addition, Shareholder has 
the right to deliver to Investment Bank on 
the Exchange Date cash equal to the value of 
the common stock that Shareholder would 
otherwise be required to deliver under the 
formula. In order to secure Shareholder's 
obligations under the Agreement, 
Shareholder pledged to Investment Banlc on 
the Execution Date 100 shares (that is, the 
maximum number of shares that 
Shareholder could be required to deliver 
under the Agreement). Shareholder retained 
the right to vote the pledged shares and to 
receive dividends. Shareholder also had the 
umestricted legal right to deliver the pledged 
shares, cash, or shares other than the 
pledged shares to satisfy its obligation under 
the Agreement. 
[ii] Rev. Rul. 2003-7 holds that the variable 
share prepaid contract described therein 
does not result in an immediate sale of the 
stock for federal tax purposes, and also does 
not result in a "constmctive sale" of the 
stock under section 1259. 
[iii] Representatives of the Service who were 
involved in the development of the new 
regulations have indicated that, in their 
view, a variable prepaid forward contract 
like that described in Rev. Rul. 2003-7 gives 
rise to a "liability" in an amount equal to the 
cash proceeds received. In addition, as the 
date for delivery of the stock approaches and 
the present value of the obligation to deliver 
the stock exceeds the cash received under 
the contract, a Reg.§ 1.752-7liability comes 
into existence. The amount of the Reg. § 
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1. 7 52-7 liability may also be affected by 
changes in the value of the stock. 
Clearly, application of this analysis to specific 
variable share prepaid forward contracts (which 
have become commonplace enough to merit the 
Service's issuance ofRev. Rul. 2003-7) will be 
fraught with complexity and uncertainty. 
IV. Timing ofBasis Reduction. Unlike Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-6, 
Treas. Reg. § 1. 7 52-7 does not adopt the approach set forth 
in section 358(h), i.e. immediate reduction in the 
transferor's basis. Rather, in the preamble to the proposed 
regulations, the Service noted that it "do[ es] not believe 
that this is the best approach for partnerships given their 
passthrough nature." In explaining this position, the 
Service noted that the partners' shares of a partnership's 
deductions are limited by the partners' outside bases in 
their partnership interests. Thus, if, at the time of an 
assumption by a partnership of a Reg. § 1.752-7 liability, 
the Reg. § 1. 7 52-7 liability partner's outside basis were 
reduced by the amount of the Reg. § 1. 7 52-7 liability, then 
the Reg. § 1. 7 52-7 liability partner would not have 
sufficient outside basis to absorb any deduction with 
respect to the Reg. § 1. 7 52-7 liability that passed through 
the partnership. Thus, the regulations do not adopt an 
approach that would reduce the Reg. § 1. 752-7 liability 
partner's outside basis immediately upon assumption by the 
partnership. 
v. Treatment of Reg. § 1.752-7 Liability as Section 704(c) 
Built-in Loss Item. Under the methodology adopted in the 
regulations, if the partnership satisfies the Reg. § 1.752-7 
liability while the Reg. § 1. 752-7 liability partner is a 
partner in the partnership, then the deduction with respect 
to the portion of the Reg. § 1.752-7 liability assumed by the 
partnership is allocated to the Reg.§ 1.752-7liability 
patiner under section 704(c)(l)(A) principles, reducing that 
partner's outside basis. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-7(c). Thus, the 
Reg.§ 1.752-7liability is treated under section 704(c) 
principles as having a built-in loss equal to the amount of 
such liability at the time of its assumption by the 
partnership. 
a) The final regulations clarify that, if the value of a 
Reg.§ 1.752-7liability decreases after the 
assumption of the obligation by the partnership, the 
"ceiling rule" applies, and the partnership and the 
partners are entitled to adopt one of the section 
704( c) methods to conect the ceiling rule disparity. 
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Thus, well drafted partnership agreements will need 
to specify the section 704(c) method to be used with 
respect to Reg. § 1.752-7 liabilities, and will also 
need to treat any "savings" realized in satisfying 
Reg. § 1. 7 52-7 liabilities as "book" income. In 
addition, the partners will need to negotiate over the 
allocation of the "book" income that reflects the 
"savings" realized on satisfaction of any Reg. § 
1. 7 52-7 liability. 
[i] Example 13. X contributes property to a 
partnership subject to an enviromnental 
liability that constitutes a Reg.§ 1.752-7 
liability. At the time of the contribution, X 
and the other partners of the partnership 
properly estimate that the resolution of the 
liability will cost $100. In accordance with 
the regulations, X's capital account credit is 
equal to the value of the contributed 
property, reduced by the $100 Reg.§ 1.752-
7 liability. X is generally allocated 10% of 
all partnership profits and losses. 
Thereafter, the partnership succeeds in 
resolving the environmental problem for 
only $80. 
[ii] The regulations require that the Reg. § 
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1. 7 52-7 liability be treated under section 
704( c) principles as having a built-in loss 
equal to the amount ofthe Reg.§ 1.752-7 
liability as of the date of the partnership's 
assumption, i.e., a built-in loss of $100. 
Presumably, X should be treated in the same 
manner as if X had contributed built-in loss 
property to the partnership with an adjusted 
basis of $100 and a value of $0. If X had 
done so and the property were thereafter 
sold for $20, the partnership would have a 
"book" gain of $20 and a tax loss of $80. 
The entire $80 tax loss would be allocated to 
X under section 704(c). Ten percent of the 
"book" gain ($2) would be allocated under 
section 704(b) to X, and the balance ($18) 
would be allocated to the other partners. A 
"ceiling mle" problem would result, and 
under the "traditional method" of Treas. 
Reg.§ 1.704-3(b), X would be allocated 
only the $80 tax loss. 
[iii] If, however, the partnership elected to 
employ the "remedial allocation method" of 
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(d), the other partners 
in the partnership would be allocated 
remedial taxable gain equal to their "book" 
gain of $18, and X would be allocated 
remedial taxable loss in an offsetting 
amount. Thus, under the remedial allocation 
method, X's total deductible loss would be 
$98, compared to $80 under the traditional 
method. 
VL "Separation Events" Triggering Basis Reduction. \ 
a) The regulations provide that if one of three 
"separation events" occurs prior to satisfaction of 
the Reg. § 1.752-7 liability that has the effect of 
separating the Reg. § 1. 752-7 liability partner from 
the Reg.§ 1.752-7liability, then there is a basis 
reduction in the Reg. § 1.752-7 liability patiner's 
outside basis. The three events identified as giving 
rise to the basis reduction are as follows: (1) a 
disposition (or partial disposition) of the partnership 
interest by the Reg. § 1. 752-7 liability partner, (2) a 
liquidation ofthe Reg.§ 1.752-7liabilitypartner's 
partnership interest, and (3) the assumption (or 
partial assumption) of the Reg. § 1.752-7 liability 
by a partner other than the Reg. § 1.752-7 liability 
partner. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-7(d) through (g). The 
basis reduction resulting from any of these events is 
deemed to occur immediately prior to the event. 
b) The Reg.§ 1.752-7liabilitypartner's outside basis 
is reduced by the lesser of: (1) the excess of the 
Reg.§ 1.752-7liability partner's outside basis in its 
partnership interest over the adjusted value of that 
interest, or (2) the remaining built-in loss associated 
with the Reg.§ 1.752-7liability. 
c) In the case of a partial disposition of the Reg. § 
1.752-7liability partner's partnership interest or a 
partial assumption of the Reg. § 1.752-7 liability by 
another partner, the Reg. § 1.752-7liability 
reduction is pro rated based on the portion of the 
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interest sold or the portion of the Reg. § 1. 7 52-7 
liability assumed. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-7(b)(6)(ii). 
vn. Economic Perfmmance of Reg. § 1.752-7 Liability After a 
"Separation Event" 
a) After the occurrence of a separation event that 
triggers a basis reduction, the partnership or the 
assuming partner, as the case may be, is not entitled 
to any deduction or capital expense on the 
satisfaction of the Reg. § 1. 7 52-7 liability to the 
extent of the remaining built-in loss associated with 
the Reg.§ 1.752-71iability. 
b) The partnership, or the assuming partner as the case 
may be, may notify the Reg. § 1.752-7 liability 
partner of its satisfaction of the Reg. § 1.752-7 
liability, in which case the Reg. § 1. 7 52-7 liability 
pminer is entitled to a deduction or loss. Treas. 
Reg.§ 1.752-7(h). 
c) In the case of a complete satisfaction, the amount of 
the deduction or loss is equal to the remaining Reg 
§ 1. 7 52-7 liability reduction. In the case of a pmiial 
satisfaction, the amount of the deduction or loss is 
equal to the amount paid by the partnership in 
satisfaction of the Reg. § 1. 7 52-7 liability (but not 
more than the Reg. § 1.752-7 liability reduction). 
d) The character of such deduction or loss is 
determined as if the Reg. § 1. 7 52-7 liability partner 
had satisfied the Reg.§ 1.752-7 liability. Ifthe 
Reg. § 1. 7 52-7 liability reduction exceeds the 
amount paid in satisfaction of the Reg.§ 1.752-7 
liability, then as to such excess the character of the 
Reg. § 1. 7 52-7 liability partner's loss is capital. 
e) In the event that the Reg. § 1.752-71iability is 
assumed by a partner other than the Reg.§ 1.752-7 
liability pminer, then, upon ultimate satisfaction of 
the Reg. § 1.752-7 liability, the assuming partner 
must adjust the basis of its pa1inership interest, any 
assets distributed by the partnership to such partner, 
or gain or loss on disposition of its partnership 
interest, as the case may be. The adjustment is 
made as if the assuming partner's basis in its 
interest at the time of the assumption were increased 
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by the lesser of: ( 1) the amount paid to satisfy the 
Reg. § 1.752-7 liability; or (2) the remaining built-
in loss associated with the Reg. § 1. 7 52-7 liability 
as of the time of the assumption. Treas. Reg. § 
1.752-7(g)(4). In making such adjustment the 
assuming partner cannot take into account any 
adjustments to depreciable basis, reduction in gain, 
or increase in loss until satisfaction of the Reg. § 
1.752-7liability. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-7(g)(4). 
vm. Exceptions to Basis Reduction Rules. There are two 
exceptions that apply to the general basis reduction rules 
discussed above. 
a) The first exception applies where the partnership 
assumes the Reg.§ 1.752-7liability as part of the 
contribution of the trade or business with which the 
liability is associated and the partnership continues 
to conduct that trade or business after the 
contribution. The regulations define a trade or 
business as a specific group of activities canied on 
by a person for the purpose of eaming income or 
profit if the activities included in that group include 
every operation that forms a part of, or a step in, the 
process of eaming income or profit. Treas. Reg. § 
1.752-7(d)(2)(i)(A); Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-7(b)(10). 
The definition provides that a group of activities 
ordinarily includes the collection of income and the 
payment of expenses. Thus, the holding of rental 
property would presumably satisfy this definition. 
Because of concems that certain activities involving 
financial instruments could be structured to 
accomplish the types of transactions that the new 
rules are designed to prevent, the regulations 
provide that the activity of acquiring, holding, or 
disposing of financial instruments does not 
constitute a trade or business. 
b) A second exception is a de minimis exception that 
is not present in section 358(h). Under this 
exception, the regulations do not apply where, 
immediately before a "separation event" that would 
otherwise trigger a basis reduction, the remaining 
built-in loss with respect to all Reg.§ 1.752-7 
liabilities assumed by the patinership (other than 
Reg. § 1.752-7liabilities that are assumed by the 
partnership with an associated trade or business) is 
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less than the lesser of 10% of the gross value of the 
partnership's assets or $1,000,000. 
1x. Coordination With Other Provisions 
a) The proposed regulations provided that the 
assumption of a Reg. § 1.752-7 liability is not 
treated as an assumption of a liability or as a 
transfer of cash for purposes of the partnership 
disguised sale mles of section 707(a)(2)(B). Prop. 
Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-7(a)(2). 
b) This would have represented a change compared to 
the provisions of the existing regulations under the 
partnership disguised sale mles, which generally 
provide that recourse and nonrecourse liabilities for 
purposes of those mles include both amounts that 
constitute recourse and nonrecourse liabilities under 
Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-1 and also amounts that would 
be treated as recourse and nonrecourse liabilities 
under those sections if they were treated as 
partnership liabilities for purposes of section 752. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.707-5(a)(2). 
c) In response to comments on this provision, the final 
regulations delete the language contained in Prop. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-7(a)(2). 
d) The final regulations attempt to conform these 
provisions with the section 704(b) regulations by 
amending Treas. Reg. § 1.704-l(b)(2)(iv)(b) to 
provide that a partner's capital account will be 
reduced by the Treas. Reg. § 1.752-7 liabilities that 
the partnership assumes from the partner and by 
amending Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(b)(3) to treat a 
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-7 liability as a nonrecourse 
liability for purposes of the partnership allocation 
mles. 
e) The treatment ofthe Reg.§ 1.752-7liabilities as 
nonrecourse liabilities for purpose of the section 
704(b) regulations is not explained in the proposed 
regulations, the final regulations or their preambles, 
nor are the implications of such treatment illustrated 
by any example. Presumably, such treatment 
invokes the whole panoply of mles under the 
section 704(b) regulations regarding nonrecourse 
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deductions and minimum gain chargebacks. The 
conceptual underpinning for this treatment seems 
dubious at best in cases where the Reg. § 1.752-7 
liability is not nonrecourse as a matter of state law. 
f) The final regulations clarify that, in determining if a 
deemed contribution of assets and assumption of 
liability as a result of a technical termination under 
section 708(b )(1 )(B) is treated as a transfer of a 
Reg. § 1.752-7 liability that is subject to Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.752-7, only liabilities that were Reg.§ 1.752-7 
liabilities of the terminating partnership are taken 
into account and, then, only to the extent of the 
amount of the liability that was subject to Treas. 
Reg.§ 1.752-7 prior to the technical termination. 
c. Treas. Reg.§ 1.358-7. In connection with the issuance of final 
regulations under section 752, the Service also issued regulations 
under section 358(h) regarding the assumption ofliabilities by 
corporations from partners or partnerships. These provisions are 
effective for assumptions of liabilities by a corporation occurring 
on or after June 24, 2003. 
1. Treas. Reg. § 1.358-7(a) provides that, for purposes of 
section 358(h), a transfer of a partnership interest to a 
corporation is treated as a transfer of the partner's share of 
each of the partnership's assets and an assumption by the 
corporation of the partner's share of partnership liabilities, 
including section 358(h) liabilities. Section 358(h) 
liabilities are liabilities described in section 358(h)(3), 
which includes any fixed or contingent obligation to make 
payment, without regard to whether the obligation is 
othetwise taken into account. 
ii. Treas. Reg.§ 1.358-7(b) provides that if a corporation 
assumes a section 358(h) liability from a partnership in an 
exchange to which section 358(a) applies, then, for 
purposes of determining the basis of the partners' interests 
in the partnership under section 705 and Treas. Reg. § 
1.704-l(b), any reduction, under section 358(h)(l), in the 
partnership's basis in corporate stock received in the 
transaction is treated as an expenditure of the partnership 
described in section 705(a)(2)(B). The final regulations 
provide that this expenditure must be allocated among the 
partners in accordance with section 704(b) and (c) and 
Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-7(c). !fa partner's share ofthe 
reduction, under section 358(h)(l), in the partnership's 
71 
basis in corporate stock exceeds the partner's basis in the 
partnership interest, then the partner generally recognizes 
gain equal to the excess, which is treated as gain from the 
sale or exchange of a patinership interest. 
111. Treas. Reg.§ 1.358-7(c) provides that, where a patinership 
assumes a section 358(h) liability from a patiner and, 
subsequently, the partner transfers all or part of the 
partner's partnership interest to a corporation in an 
exchange to which section 358(a) applies, then, for 
purposes of applying section 358(h)(2), the section 358(h) 
liability is treated as associated only with the contribution 
made to the partnership by that partner. 
D. CONCLUSION 
1. Through careful crafting of guarantees, indemnities, deficit restoration 
obligations and capital contribution obligations, partnership and limited 
liability company liability allocations may be managed in a way that 
preserves the desired share of the liability while minimizing the taxpayer's 
economic exposure. 
III. PROPOSED PARTNERSHIP LIABILITY REGULATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
1. On January 29, 2014, Treasury and the Service issued far-reaching and 
extremely taxpayer-adverse proposed regulations addressing the allocation 
of partnership recourse and nonrecourse liabilities under section 752. 15 
Among other things, the proposed regulations specify that so-called 
bottom guarantees will not increase the guaranteeing patiner' s share of 
partnership liabilities. The proposed regulations have the potential to 
trigger gain for many patiners with negative tax basis capital accounts or 
limit a partner's ability to take losses into account. 16 
2. The proposed regulations will apply prospectively from the date they are 
published in final fonn. They provide for a seven-year transition period 
15 REG-119305-11. 
16 The proposed regulations also include changes to the partnership disguised sale mles under 
section 707, which generally are not problematic. The proposed changes to the section 707 
regulations are beyond the scope of this outline. 
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during which some obligations may still be taken into account under the 
existing partnership recourse debt allocation mles. 
3. It is widely understood that the original motivation for changing the 
section 752 regulations was to limit taxpayers' ability to stmcture a 
leveraged partnership transaction that complies with the debt-financed 
distribution exception to the partnership disguised sale mles under section 
707. 17 The proposed regulations do little in this regard. Although the 
regulations may limit the ability of pminers without sufficient net worth to 
take advantage of such a stmcture, they generally would not prevent 
taxpayers from receiving distributions of cash in redemption of a large 
portion of their equity without the recognition of taxable gain. 
4. Instead, the proposed regulations would impose subjective- and in many 
cases, noncommercial- requirements that must be satisfied for any 
pminership liability to be treated as a recourse liability under section 752. 
They would create an unadministrable regime and would shift allocations 
of debt away from partners who bear economic risk for the debt to those 
who do not. The regulations would fail to overmle the decision in Rap han 
v. United States/ 8 in direct contravention of congressional intent, and they 
would allow or require allocations of deductions to partners in direct 
conflict with the fundamental principles of the section 704(b) regulations. 
Accordingly, we recommend that the proposed regulations be withdrawn. 
We suggest that any concerns with the current application of the 
partnership disguised sale mles be addressed through targeted changes to 
the section 707 regulations rather than the creation of an entirely new 
regulatmy regime under section 752 that is applicable to every partnership 
and partnership liability. 
B. RECOURSE LIABILITIES- CURRENT RULES 
1. Since at least 1956, the themy underlying the regulations governing the 
allocation of partnership liabilities has been that the liabilities should be 
allocated to pminers who would be required to pay the liability if the 
partnership was unable to do so because those partners are considered to 
bear the economic burden for the liability. If a lender would have no 
recourse to any partner if the palinership was unable to repay the liability, 
17 Amy S. Elliot, "Treasury Officials Explain New Bottom-Dollar Guarantee Rules," Tax Notes, 
Mar. 3, 2014, p. 904 (quoting Lisa Zarlenga, Treasury tax legislative counsel, as saying "When 
we were considering changes in the section 752 mles related to [the debt-financed distribution] 
exception, we determined that celiain principles that were being applied for just section 707 
purposes ought to apply equally in non-disguised sale cases"). 
18 3 Cl. Ct. 457 (1983), rev'd on this issue, 759 F.2d 879 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
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only partnership profits could satisfy the liability. Accordingly, the 
regulations have allocated partnership nonrecourse liabilities among the 
partners in the same way the partnership's profits would be allocated 
among them. 19 
2. Consistent with that theory, as described in detail in Section 1.01 above, 
under the cunent section 752 regulations, a partnership liability is 
allocated to a partner as a partnership recourse liability to the extent that 
the partner bears the economic risk of loss for the liability under a 
relatively mechanical constmctive liquidation test. 
C. PROPOSED PARTNERSHIP RECOURSE LIABILITY ALLOCATION 
REGULATIONS 
1. The proposed regulations would generally make three critical changes to 
the cunent section 752 regulations regarding partnership recourse 
liabilities. First, they would impose recognition requirements that must be 
satisfied for a partner or related person's payment obligation to be 
recognized. Among these recognition requirements are provisions that 
would prevent so-called bottom guarantees from increasing the 
guaranteeing partner's share of liabilities. Second, the proposed 
regulations would reduce the amount of any partner's or related person's 
payment obligation for a partnership liability to the extent of any right of 
reimbursement from any "person." Third, the proposed regulations would 
apply the net value requirement, which is cunently applicable only to 
disregarded entities, to all regarded entities. These proposed changes are 
summarized below, followed by our analysis and commentaty. 
2. Recognition Requirements 
a. The preamble to the proposed regulations states that the Service 
and Treasmy "are concerned that some partners or related persons 
have entered into payment obligations that are not commercial 
solely to achieve an allocation of a partnership liability to such 
partner."20 It further states that the Service and Treasmy believe 
that section 79 of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (DEFRA)-
which overmled the decision in Raphan21 (discussed below) and 
19 See American Law Institute, "Federal Income Tax Project: Subchapter K, Proposals on 
Taxation ofPattners," at 264 (1984). 
20 Preamble to REG-119305-11, at 17. 
21 3 Cl. Ct. 457. The Federal Circuit's reversal in Raphan, 759 F.2d 879, occuned after the 
enactment ofDEFRA. 
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directed Treasmy to prescribe regulations under section 7 52 on the 
treatment of guarantees and other payment obligations -was 
intended to ensure that bona fide, commercial payment obligations 
would be given effect under section 752. 22 As a result, in contrast 
to the cunent relatively mechanical and administrable partnership 
recourse debt allocation rules, the proposed regulations would 
impose recognition requirements - some of which are entirely 
subjective- that must be satisfied for a partner's or related 
person's payment obligation to be taken into account in 
detennining whether a partner bears the economic risk of loss for a 
partnership liability. The Service and Treasmy intend that the 
satisfaction of those requirements will establish that the terms of a 
payment obligation are "commercially reasonable and are not 
designed solely to obtain tax benefits."23 
b. A payment obligation, other than one imposed by state law 
(including the governing state partnership statute), must satisfy the 
following seven requirements to be taken into account:24 
1. The obligor must maintain a commercially reasonable net 
worth throughout the term of the payment obligation or be 
subject to commercially reasonable contractual restrictions 
on transfers of assets for inadequate consideration. 
11. The obligor must be required to periodically provide 
commercially reasonable documentation regarding the 
obligor's financial condition. 
111. The term of the obligation must not end before that of the 
partnership liability. 
iv. The payment obligation must not require that the primaty 
or any other obligor on the partnership liability directly or 
indirectly hold money or other liquid assets in an amount 
that exceeds the reasonable needs of that obligor. 
v. The obligor must receive arm's-length consideration for 
assuming the payment obligation. 
22 Preamble to REG-119305-11, at 17-18. 
23 Id. at 18. 
24 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(3)(ii). 
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v1. In the case of a guarantee or similar anangement, the 
obligor must be liable up to the full amount of its payment 
obligation if, and to the extent that, any amount of the 
partnership liability is not otherwise satisfied. 
vn. In the case of an indemnity, reimbursement, or similar 
anangement, the obligor must be liable up to the full 
amount of its obligation if, and to the extent that, any 
amount of the indemnitee's or other beneficiaty's payment 
obligation is satisfied. 
3. Right of Reimbursement From Any Person 
a. The cunent partnership recourse liability regulations reduce the 
amount of a partner's or related person's obligation to make a 
payment for a partnership liability to the extent that the patiner or 
related person is entitled to reimbursement from another partner or 
a person related to another partner.25 
b. The preamble states that the Service and Treasmy concluded that a 
right to be reimbursed for a payment or contribution by an 
unrelated person (for example, under an indemnification agreement 
from a third party) should be taken into account in the same 
manner. 
c. Accordingly, the proposed regulations provide that a partner's or 
related person's payment obligation for a partnership liability is 
reduced to the extent that the partner or related person is entitled to 
reimbursement from any person. 26 
4. Net Value Requirement Extended 
a. As noted above, the cunent patinership recourse liability 
regulations generally presume that all partners and related persons 
will satisfy their payment obligations unless the facts and 
circumstances indicate a plan to circumvent or avoid the 
obligation. This presumption does not apply to entities that are 
disregarded as separate from their owners for federal income tax 
purposes. Those entities are treated as bearing economic risk of 
loss for a partnership liability only to the extent of their net value 
as determined under Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(k). 
25 Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(b)(5). 
26 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(l). 
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b. The proposed regulations would expand the application of the net 
value requirement in reg. section 1.752-2(k) to all partners or 
related persons (including grantor tmsts ), other than individuals 
and decedents' estates. 
c. The expansion would apply to all payment obligations associated 
with liabilities that are not trade payables.27 Further, the proposed 
regulations would require that an obligor subject to the net value 
requirement timely give the partnership information about the 
obligor's net value that is appropriately allocable to the 
partnership's liabilities. 28 
D. RECOURSE LIABILITIES- COMMENTARY 
1. DEFRA andRaphan 
a. As noted in the preamble to the proposed regulation, in DEFRA, 
Congress directed Treasmy to issue regulations under section 752 
that reject the holding in Raphan. However, as explained below, 
the proposed regulations do not reject the holding in Raphan, but 
adopt it. This raises a serious question about the validity of the 
regulations. Moreover, the proposed regulations would allow- in 
fact they would require - that many nomecourse liabilities 
guaranteed by one or more partners be included in the tax basis of 
the partnership interest of non-guaranteeing partners, creating the 
same potential for abuse that Congress sought to preclude when it 
directed Treasury to issue regulations rejecting the holding in 
Rap han. 
b. The regulations issued in 1956 under section 752, which were in 
effect during the tax year involved in Raphan, contained only a 
few sentences conceming the sharing of partnership liabilities.29 
Those regulations generally provided that a partner's share of 
partnership liabilities would be determined in accordance with the 
partner's ratio for sharing losses under the partnership agreement. 
However, a limited partner generally could be allocated a share of 
liabilities only to the extent it had an obligation to make a future 
capital contribution to the limited partnership. An exception 
applied "where none of the partners have any personal liability 
27 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(3)(iii)(B). 
28 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(3)(iii)(C). 
29 Treas. Reg.§ l-752-1(e), before removal by T.D. 8237 (Dec. 29, 1988). 
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30 Id 
with respect to a partnership liability (as in the case of a mortgage 
on real estate acquired by the partnership without the assumption 
by the partnership or any of the pminers of any liability on the 
m01tgage )."30 In that case all partners, including limited partners, 
shared the liability in the same proportion as they shared profits. 
c. In Raphan, a limited partnership borrowed money on a 
nonrecourse basis (that is, the terms of the debt limited the lender's 
recourse to specified assets of the partnership). The general 
partners, who were individuals, guaranteed the debt. The Claims 
Comi held that the guarantee did not cause the general patiners to 
be personally liable on the debt and that the limited partners could 
therefore include a share of the debt in basis. In 1985 the Federal 
Circuit reversed, but before it did, Congress addressed the issue in 
DEFRA. 
d. Section 79 ofDEFRA, titled "Ovenuling of Raphan Case," 
provided as follows: 
(a) GENERAL RULE.-Section 752 of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954 (and the regulations prescribed 
thereunder) shall be applied without regard to the result 
reached in the case ofRaphan vs the United States, 3 Cl. 
Ct. 457 (1983). 
(b) REGULATIONS.-In amending the regulations 
prescribed under section 7 52 of such Code to reflect 
subsection (a), the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate 
shall prescribe regulations relating to liabilities including 
the treatment of guarantees, assumptions, indemnity 
agreements and similar arrangements. 
e. The legislative history of the provision stated as follows: 
Under the agreement, the decision in the Raphan case is not 
to be followed for purposes of applying section 752 or the 
regulations thereunder. ... [T]he conferees intend that the 
revisions to the section 752 regulations will be based 
largely on the manner in which the patiners, and persons 
related to the partners, share the economic risk of loss with 
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respect to partnership debt (other than bona fide 
nonrecourse debt, as defined by such regulations).31 
f. Despite that clear directive from Congress, the proposed 
regulations would not reject the holding of the Claims Court in 
Raphan, but instead would adopt it. The Federal Circuit in Raphan 
stated: 
Examining the substance here establishes that the [general 
partners] did not act at arm's length in guaranteeing the 
construction loan. They did not charge [the partnership] for 
the guarantee, as would an unrelated person, nor did [the 
partnership] agree to pay [the general partners'] interest if 
they were called upon to meet their guarantee. 32 
g. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b )(ii)(E) specifies that for a payment 
obligation to be recognized, the partner or related person must 
receive arm's-length consideration for assuming it. Because the 
general partners in Raphan did not receive arm's-length 
consideration for the guarantee, their payment obligation would be 
disregarded under the proposed regulations. The debt would be 
treated as nomecourse and includable in the basis of the limited 
partners- exactly the result that Congress sought to negate in 
DEFRA. As noted, this raises serious questions about the validity 
of the proposed regulations. 
h. Beyond the validity issue, the proposed regulations allow the exact 
abuse that Congress sought to negate in DEFRA: the inclusion of 
liabilities in the basis of all partners, when only a subset bears the 
economic risk of loss for the liability, and the concomitant ability 
to traffic in noneconomic losses. As one commentator observed, 
Treasury "feared a massive raid on the fisc following Raphan."33 
Post-DEFRA legislative enactments, such as the passive loss rules 
of section 469, may help limit the damage to the fisc, but the 
policy concerns that motivated Congress to ovenule Rap han in 
DEFRA are still present today, and the proposed regulations fail to 
address them. 
31 H.R. Rep. No. 98-861, 869 (1984). 
32 Raphan, 759 F2d, at 885. 
33 William S. McKee et al., Federal Taxation of Partnerships and Partners, at 8-4 (2007). 
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2. The Recognition Requirements 
a. According to the preamble, the satisfaction of the seven 
recognition requirements listed in Prop. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-
2(b )(3)(ii) is intended to establish that an obligation entered into by 
a partner or related person regarding a partnership liability is 
"commercial." As noted, the theory underlying the partnership 
recourse liability allocation rules is that liabilities should be 
allocated to partners that would be required to fund them if the 
partnership were unable to do so. Whether or not an obligation 
meets a "commercial" standard does not change the fact that a 
partner with a legally enforceable payment obligation for a 
partnership liability bears economic risk for that liability, and 
under the theory described above, that economic risk should be 
taken into account. As noted above, under the antiabuse rule in the 
current regulations, an obligation would be disregarded in 
circumstances that the Service and Treasury deem abusive. 
b. Moreover, unlike the existing objective and administrable section 
752 regulations, recognition requirements 1, 2, 4, and 5 involve a 
determination of the meaning of the terms "commercially 
reasonable," "reasonable needs," or "arm's length." These 
amorphous and subjective tests will require partners and 
partnerships to make difficult, if not impossible, judgments in 
order to determine whether a particular obligation can be taken into 
account. Given the amorphous and subjective nature of these tests, 
we expect that Service agents will challenge many payment 
obligations on the grounds that the commercially reasonable, 
reasonable needs, or arm's-length requirement is not met, if a 
challenge would result in an increase in tax. We are particularly 
surprised that the proposed regulations would require a subjective 
analysis of an obligation for it to be taken into account, given the 
public statements by the Service and Treasmy representatives 
preceding the issuance of the proposed regulations that any new 
rules concerning such a determination under section 752 would be 
objective and mechanical.34 
34 See Elliott, "Guarantors May Need to Document Net Worth, Katz Says," Tax Notes, Sept. 30, 
2013, p. 1528 ("Craig Gerson, attorney-advisor, Treasmy Office of Tax Legislative Counsel, 
said the government is designing the test in the regs to be mechanical in nature," and Clifford 
Warren, senior counsel for the Service's Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Passthroughs and 
Special Industries), "added that the government is tlying to avoid using phrases like 'business 
purpose' and 'commercially reasonable' in the guidance. 'We want it to be a more objective test,· 
Footnote continued on next·page 
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c. What does it mean to be required to maintain a commercially 
reasonable net worth, to be subject to commercially reasonable 
contractual restrictions on transfers without consideration, or, for a 
primary obligor to hold money or other liquid assets in excess of 
its reasonable needs? Those tenns will clearly have different 
meanings depending on the obligor, borrower, partnership's 
activities, and assets securing the loan. Similarly, what is arm's-
length consideration for entering into a guarantee or other 
obligation? In our experience, a partner is often willing to enter 
into a guarantee of partnership debt because the partner will benefit 
from the loan to the partnership and does not require additional 
consideration. Does that mean that the arm's-length consideration 
may be zero? Will taxpayers be forced to require lenders to 
impose net worth documentation and maintenance requirements, or 
partnerships to pay a guarantee fee, just to satisfy these 
requirements even if they would not exist in an otherwise 
commercial transaction? Even if taxpayers believe they can 
establish that the commercially reasonable or arm's-length 
requirement has been met, these subjective standards open the door 
for challenges by the Service and will surely result in litigation. 
d. The third recognition requirement- that the term of the obligation 
must not end before the term of the partnership liability- also does 
not comport with the commercial reality in many situations. For 
example, loans in the real estate development context are often 
required to be fully guaranteed by a partner only until the property 
reaches a specified level of stabilization (that is, a specified 
occupancy or rental income level is reached). Further, if the 
partnership sells the property that secures a partnership liability, 
and the liability is assumed by the purchaser that guarantees it, a 
partner-guarantor typically has the right to be released from the 
guarantee. Even if the guarantor manages to satisfy the other five 
recognition requirements are listed above, if a guarantee includes 
these common commercial release terms, the proposed regulations 
would require the guarantee to be disregarded and the partnership 
debt treated as nonrecourse, even though the guarantor bears the 
true economic risk for the debt. 
e. The sixth and seventh recognition requirements are extremely 
broad and would prevent any obligation that is not a top guarantee 
Footnote continued from previous page 
to be frank. We don't want to be litigating about what's right and what's wrong in this area,' he 
said."). 
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or similar aiTangement from being taken into account. The Service 
has expressed concems about whether a bottom guarantee of the 
last dollars of a liability should be taken into account as an 
obligation, because that guarantee is of the least risky portion of 
the liability, is not typically sought out by lenders and is entered 
into solely for tax reasons. That is, it is non-commercial. Example 
14 illustrates the application of this provision. 
f. Example 14 
1. A, B, and C are equal members of ABC LLC, which is 
treated as a patinership for federal income tax purposes. 
ABC botTows $1,000 from Bank. A guarantees payment of 
up to $300 of the ABC liability if any portion of the $1,000 
is not recovered by Banlc Accordingly, A's guarantee is a 
top guarantee. B guarantees payment ofup to $200 of the 
ABC liability, but only if Banlc otherwise recovers less than 
$200. Accordingly, B's guarantee is a bottom guarantee. 
A and B each waive rights of contribution against each 
other, and each of their guarantees satisfies recognition 
requirements 1 through 5 described above. Because A is 
obligated to pay up to $300 if, and to the extent that, any 
amount of the $1,000 partnership liability is not recovered 
by Bank, A's guarantee satisfies the sixth recognition 
requirement and is recognized as an obligation for purposes 
of section 752. However, because B is obligated to pay up 
to $200 only if, and to the extent that, Bank otherwise 
recovers less than $200 ofthe $1,000 liability, B's 
guarantee does not satisfy the sixth recognition requirement 
and is disregarded. 35 
n. In fact, B' s guarantee would be disregarded under the 
proposed regulations even if B guaranteed $999 of the 
$1,000 liability. Does it make sense to treat a guarantor of 
$999 of a $1,000 liability as bearing no economic risk of 
loss for the liability while a guarantor of the top $200 of a 
$1,000 liability is given full credit for the guarantee? 
Moreover, there are circumstances under which a bottom 
guarantee may expose the guarantor to more economic risk 
than a full or top guarantee. For example, a top $200 
guarantee of a $50,000 liability secured by an asset with a 
$1 million value may be less likely to have to be satisfied 
35 See Prop. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(£), Example 10. 
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than a bottom $200 guarantee of a $300 liability secured by 
an asset with a $500 value. That Treasury and the Service 
do not view the bottom guarantee as being "commercial" 
does not change the fact that a bottom guarantor tmly may 
bear greater economic risk for a partnership liability than a 
top guarantor. 
g. The broad language in the sixth recognition requirement would 
also cause a vertical slice guarantee to be disregarded (for 
example, 50 percent of eve1y dollar of shortfall) because the 
guarantor would not be liable for 100 percent of eve1y dollar of 
shortfall.36 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(3)(ii)(F) further 
provides that in determining whether an obligation satisfies the 
sixth recognition requirement, the te1ms of a guarantee or similar 
aiTangement will be treated as modified by any right of indemnity, 
reimbursement, or similar aiTangement regardless of whether that 
aiTangement would be recognized as an obligation for purposes of 
section 752. That mle does not apply, however, to a right of 
proportionate contribution mnning between pminers or related 
persons that are co-obligors on a payment obligation for which 
each is jointly and severally liable. Accordingly, under the 
proposed regulations, if there is more than one obligor for a 
pminership liability, even a top guarantee or similar obligation 
would be disregarded unless the obligors are jointly and severally 
liable. Similarly, a top guarantee must be disregarded if the 
obligor has any right of indemnification from any person regarding 
the guarantee. These points are illustrated in Example 2. 
h. Example 15 
1. The facts of Example 15 are the same as in Example 14, 
except that C agrees to indemnify A up to the $50 that A 
pays under its guarantee. Under the proposed regulations, 
C's indemnity is treated as modifying A's guarantee such 
that A is treated as liable for only $250 of A's $300 
guarantee. Accordingly, because A is not liable up to the 
full amount of the $300 guarantee if, and to the extent, any 
amount of the partnership liability is not otherwise 
satisfied, A's guarantee is completely disregarded?7 This 
is true even if C's indemnification obligation does not 
36 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(£), Example 12. 
37 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(£), Example 11. 
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satisfy all the recognition requirements. Based on the 
literal language ofProp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(3)(ii)(F), 
it seems to be the case even if C's indemnity is a bottom 
indemnity that applies only to the extent that A's payment 
on the guarantee exceeds $250. Thus, a $250 top guarantee 
would be respected, but a $300 top guarantee that is subject 
to a $50 bottom indemnity would not be, even though the 
latter anangement involves greater economic risk for the 
guarantor. 
1. Contrary to the stated intention to recognize commercial 
obligations for purposes of section 752, the proposed regulations 
fail to respect guarantees that are entered into solely for nontax 
reasons, even if they satisfy the other five recognition requirements 
set forth above. For example, a lender may require that there be 
multiple guarantors of a partnership liability on a joint, but not 
several, basis. That common commercial obligation is disregarded 
under the proposed regulations, which results in the debt being 
treated as nonrecourse. Further, as illustrated in Example 3, it is 
common in many purely commercial, non-tax-motivated 
transactions for a majority partner that guarantees a partnership 
liability to have a right of partial indemnification against specified 
minority partners. 
J. Example 16 
1. A is the 90 percent managing member of ABC LLC, which 
is in the trade or business of developing and renting office 
buildings. B and C are key employees, and each owns a 5 
percent membership interest. ABC LLC borrows $100 
million from Bank under a constmction loan. For non-tax-
related reasons, Ban1c requires that A guarantee repayment 
of the constmction loan. A agrees to guarantee the 
constmction loan, if B and C each indemnify A for 5 
percent of any payments that A is required to make under 
the guarantee so that they bear an economic risk for the 
constmction loan commensurate with their economic 
interests in ABC LLC. 
n. Even though B 's and C 's agreement to indemnify A was 
negotiated as part of a non-tax-related transaction, the 
proposed regulations would cause the constmction loan to 
be treated as a nonrecourse partnership liability. 
Depending on the determination of the ABC LLC 
members' shares of profits under Prop. Treas. Reg. § 
1.752-3(a)(3), the allocation of the constmction loan among 
A, B, and C may be very different from their shares of 
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economic risk for the construction loan on account of the 
guarantee and indemnity anangement. 
k. As noted above, the proposed regulations provide that the 
recognition factors do not apply to payment obligations imposed 
by state law, including the governing state partnership statute. As 
shown in Examples 17 and 18, this may cause payment obligations 
in economically identical situations to be treated differently. 
1. Example 17 
i. A is the general partner in the AB limited partnership, 
which borrows $1,000 from Bank on a recourse basis. 
Under state law, A is liable for the debts and obligations of 
the AB limited partnership. 
11. Accordingly, under the proposed regulations, A's state law 
payment obligation is respected regardless of whether it 
satisfies any of the seven recognition requirements. 
m. Example 18 
1. A is the managing member of AB LLC, which bmTows 
$1,000 from Bank on a basis that is recourse to AB LLC 
but not to any members. A, as the managing member, 
guarantees the AB LLC debt. 
11. Even though A's economic risk is identical to its economic 
risk in Example 4, A's payment obligation will not be taken 
into account unless A satisfies all the recognition 
requirements. 
n. It is also unclear whether a DRO can ever be taken into account as 
a payment obligation under the proposed regulations. Prop. Treas. 
Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(3)(i) states that an obligation to make a payment 
described under Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b )(3)(i)(A) or (B) will 
not be recognized unless the seven recognition requirements are 
satisfied. Obligations described in Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-
2(b )(3)(i)(B) include the obligation to make a capital contribution 
and to restore a deficit capital account upon liquidation of the 
partnership. Accordingly, a DRO must satisfy all seven 
recognition requirements to be taken into account as a payment 
obligation, which is unlikely. As illustrated in Example 19, this 
will cause DROs to be disregarded for section 752 purposes. 
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o. Example 19 
1. As in Example 7 above, assume that X is a limited partner 
in a limited partnership and is generally allocated 1 percent 
of partnership profits and losses. The partnership's only 
debt is a recourse debt of $100 from a third party. Assume 
that X must maintain a share of the debt equal to at least 
$10 to avoid receiving a deemed distribution under section 
752(b) that will exceed X's basis in its partnership interest 
and trigger gain under section 731(a). X enters into a DRO 
for $10. Under the DRO, upon liquidation ofX's interest 
in the partnership, X will be obligated to make a capital 
contribution to the partnership equal to the lesser of $10 or 
the amount ofX's deficit capital account. Assume further 
that the partnership agreement meets the requirements of 
the safe harbor of Treas. Reg. § 1. 704-1 (b )(2) and that in 
lieu of the 1 percent allocation of losses to X, the 
partnership agreement requires that X be allocated all 
losses until X's capital account equals negative $10. 
Finally, assume that the book balance sheet of the 
patinership reflects the following: 
Property 80 100 Liability 
( .20) X 
(19.80) Other Partners 
n. As described in Example 7 avove, under the current section 
752 regulations, X's DRO should cause $10 of the debt to 
be allocated to X. Upon a constructive liquidation of the 
partnership, the property would have a zero value and the 
partnership would be deemed to dispose of it for no 
consideration, resulting in an $80 loss. Of this amount, 
$9.80 would be allocated to X, and the balance would be 
allocated to the other patiners. X would have a deficit 
capital account of $10 and would be required to contribute 
this amount to the partnership. As a result, X would bear 
the economic risk of loss for $10 of the debt. 38 
38 See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(£), Example 2. 
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111. It is unlikely that X's DRO could satisfy all seven of the 
recognition requirements. The DRO would become due 
and payable upon liquidation ofX's interest in the 
partnership. For a DRO to be effective, the section 704(b) 
regulations require that it be satisfied by the later of the end 
of the tax year in which the partner's interest in the 
partnership is liquidated or within 90 days of that 
liquidation.39 As a result, X's obligation may end before 
the termination of the partnership's liability, in violation of 
the third recognition requirement. Also, it would be highly 
unusual for X to be paid any consideration for entering into 
a DRO, so the DRO may fail the fifth recognition 
requirement. 
iv. It is also unclear whether the sixth recognition requirement 
applies to a DRO or capital contribution obligation. If it 
does, X's DRO would fail. As noted above, Prop. Treas. 
Reg.§ 1.752-2(b)(3)(ii)(F) states that it applies to a 
guarantee or similar anangement, while Prop. Treas. Reg. § 
1.752-2(b)(3)(i) states that no payment obligation will be 
recognized if it fails to satisfy the seven recognition 
requirements. The reference to a guarantee or similar 
arrangement as opposed to a payment obligation may 
indicate that the sixth recognition requirement is intended 
to apply to a nanower category of payment obligations. If 
the sixth recognition requirement in the proposed 
regulations applies to DROs, however, X's DRO would 
presumably be disregarded. That is because if the 
property's value was more than $70.20 but less than the full 
$100 liability amount, on liquidation of the partnership, X 
would be allocated less than $9.80 ofloss and would be 
required to make a capital contribution of less than $10, 
even if the partnership's assets were insufficient to satisfy 
more than $10 of the partnership liability. Accordingly, X 
would not be liable up to the full amount of its payment 
obligation if, and to the extent that, any amount of the 
partnership liability were not otherwise satisfied. 
v. DROs are commonly entered into to allow partners to be 
allocated losses in compliance with the section 704(b) 
regulations. Also, to the extent that a partnership 
39 Treas. Reg.§ 1.704-1(b)(3). 
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refmances a nomecourse loan encumbering contributed 
property with a recourse loan or line of credit, the 
contributing partner may enter into a DRO to prevent the 
recognition of gain as a result of a reduction in the partner's 
allocable share of partnership liabilities. 
v1. Real estate investment trust operating partnerships (REIT 
OPs) often finance their activities through a recourse line of 
credit rather than prope1iy-specific nomecourse debt. As a 
result, many REIT OPs refinance nomecourse debt secured 
by contributed properties in their recourse line of credit as 
pati of their normal commercial operations. In those cases, 
the contributing partner may enter into a DRO to ensure 
that it can retain sufficient debt to avoid a deemed 
distribution in excess of tax basis. The proposed 
regulations would require REIT OPs to disregard such an 
obligation. 
p. The proposed regulations further modify the existing antiabuse rule 
in Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(j) to provide that an obligation will not be 
taken into account if the facts and circumstances indicate that the 
partnership liability is part of a plan or arrangement involving the 
use of tiered partnerships, intermediaries, or similar arrangements 
to convert a single liability into more than one liability, with a 
principal pul]ose of circumventing the sixth recognition 
requirement. 0 Example 20 explores the application of that rule. 
q. Example 20 
1. A, B, and C are equal members of ABC LLC, which is the 
sole member of Property LLC, a disregarded entity that 
owns property. Property LLC borrows $300 from Bank, 
secured by a mortgage on the property. ABC LLC borrows 
$700 from Bank, secured by its membership interest in 
Property LLC (mezzanine financing). B enters into a full 
guarantee of Property LLC's $300 mortgage debt, which 
contains provisions that satisfy recognition requirements 1 
through 5. 
n. B 's guarantee appears to satisfy the sixth recognition 
requirement because B will be obligated to make a payment 
40 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(j)(4). 
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on its guarantee to the extent that Property LLC's mortgage 
debt is not fully satisfied. 
111. However, because B's guarantee is ofthe mortgage debt, 
which is senior in priority to the mezzanine financing, the 
risk that B 's guarantee will be called is the same as the risk 
ofB's bottom guarantee in Example 14, which was 
disregarded under the sixth recognition requirement. Is this 
arrangement subject to the modified antiabuse rule in Prop. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(j)(4)?41 
1v. Presumably, the modification to the antiabuse rule in Prop. 
Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(j)(4) would cause a financing 
transaction to be closely scrutinized that consists of both 
fully guaranteed first mortgage debt and one or more tiers 
of mezzanine or other subordinate debt because the 
guarantee would be of the least risky portion of the 
financing package. Mortgage and mezzanine financing 
structures, which are common commercial aiTangements, 
will be subject to scrutiny and potential challenge under the 
proposed regulations to the extent that less than all the tiers 
of mortgage and mezzanine financing are fully guaranteed. 
3. Right of Reimbursement From Any Person 
a. As noted above, the proposed regulations reduce the amount of a 
partner's or related person's payment obligation for a partnership 
liability if that obligor has any right to reimbursement from any 
person.42 Apparently, this rule is intended to apply to 
reimbursement rights from the debtor partnership. Although the 
41 At a conference on February 24, 2014, Craig Gerson, attorney-advisor in the Office of Tax 
Legislative Counsel, said that "tranched debt- the different components of it- are respected as 
separate debt instruments . . . So if you guarantee only the senior debt in tranched debt and you 
comply with all of the requirements of the regulation, that debt guarantee would be respected." 
Gerson added, however, that the aiTangement would need to pass muster under general tax 
principles and the reg. section 1.752-2 antiabuse rule. Elliot, supra note 3. 
At a conference on March 31, 2014, Clifford WaiTen, special counsel to the Service associate 
chief counsel (passthroughs and special industries), said, "If it's a true tiered loan and there 
really is a first and second- it was not artificially contrived through some intermediary- I think 
we would respect that." Asked whether the tranches could be issued by the same lender and still 
be respected as separate, Warren responded "Yes, if it's real ... I'd probably know it ifi saw it." 
Elliott, "Tranched Debt May be Respected Under New Bottom-Dollar Guarantee Rules," Tax 
Notes, Apr. 7, 2014, p. 35. 
42 Prop. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(b) 
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term "person" is not defined in the proposed regulations, the 
general meaning of the te1m as set forth in section 7701(a)(l) 
includes a partnership. In describing the current regulations, the 
preamble states that "in detetmining the amount of any obligation 
of a partner to make a payment to a creditor or a contribution to the 
partnership with respect to a partnership liability, section 1. 7 52-
2(b)(1) reduces the pminer's payment obligation by the amount of 
any reimbursement that the partner would be entitled to receive 
from another partner, a person related to another partner, or the 
partnership" (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Service and 
Treasury apparently believe that the current regulations reduce the 
amount of a payment obligation on account of a right to be 
reimbursed by the partnership. In fact, the preamble misstates 
Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(b)(1), which only reduces the amount of an 
obligor's payment obligation that is taken into account for 
purposes of section 7 52 to the extent of any right of reimbursement 
from another partner or a person related to another partner. The 
current regulations do not reduce the amount of an obligor's 
payment obligation as a result of a right to be reimbursed by the 
partnership. This is consistent with the constructive liquidation 
test ofTreas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b). Under the assumptions made in 
that test, any right of reimbursement from the partnership would be 
wmihless. 
b. A commercial, non-tax-motivated guarantee of a partnership 
liability typically entitles the guarantor to step into the shoes of the 
lender under a right of subrogation so that the guarantor is entitled 
to pursue the partnership's assets. As noted above, however, 
application of the current regulations' constructive liquidation test, 
which would generally be retained in the proposed regulations, 
requires that the partnership's assets be deemed worthless. If a 
guarantor's subrogation rights against the pminership are taken 
into account under the proposed regulations to reduce the amount 
of a payment obligation for purposes of section 752, the 
constructive liquidation test would effectively be ignored, and a 
commercial guarantee with subrogation rights against the 
partnership would never be taken into account as an obligation. 
c. As illustrated in Example 21, the reduction of a partner's or related 
person's obligation on account of any reimbursement right from 
any person, as opposed to a reimbursement right from another 
partner or person related to another partner, arguably may negate 
any payment obligation of an entity that is supported by a capital 
contribution obligation from its owners. 
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d. Example 21 
1. A, B, and C are equal members of ABC LLC, which 
bonows $1,000 from Bank. A, a corporation, guarantees 
payment of up to $300 of the ABC liability if any amount 
of the $1,000 is not recovered by Banlc (a top guarantee). 
One of A's shareholders, individual X, agrees to make a 
capital contribution to A to the extent that A becomes liable 
to make a payment on its $300 top guarantee of ABC's 
liability. X's agreement ensures that A is treated as having 
sufficient net value to satisfy the expanded net value 
requirement in the proposed regulations, discussed in detail 
below. 
11. Under the current regulations, A would be allocated $300 
of the ABC liability on account of its guarantee. 
iii. However, when applying the proposed regulations to this 
stmcture, even if A's guarantee satisfies all the recognition 
requirements, it would be disregarded ifX's capital 
contribution obligation is deemed to be a reimbursement 
right from X. In that case, the $300 of ABC's liability 
would be treated as a nonrecourse liability. Presumably, 
this is not the intended result because it is inconsistent with 
the purpose of the net value requirement, but it nevertheless 
appears consistent with the language of the proposed 
regulations. 
e. We also note that the right to be reimbursed by a person other than 
another partner or a person related to another partner does not 
change the fact that a partner that undertakes a payment obligation 
for a partnership liability bears more economic risk of loss than the 
partners that have no payment obligation. For example, a 
guarantor with a right of reimbursement from a third party bears 
the risk of collection on the indemnity. Accordingly, if risk of loss 
is the touchstone, it makes more sense to allocate the liability to 
that partner than to treat the liability as a partnership nonrecourse 
liability and allocate it to partners that bear no economic risk of 
loss for the liability. Further, if a partner or related person 
purchases insurance to cover its risk of having to make a payment 
under a guarantee of a partnership liability, the insurance 
represents an asset purchased by the partner-guarantor and should 
not be viewed as a reduction in the guarantor's economic risk of 
loss. 
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4. Interaction With Section 704(b) 
a. The section 704(b) regulations contain special rules for "pminer 
nonrecourse debt," which are designed to require that losses 
attributable to that debt be allocated to the partner that will bear 
any economic burden corresponding to the allocation. The 
proposed regulations would sub silentio dramatically alter the 
partner nonrecourse debt rules in the section 704(b) regulations. 
Moreover, as discussed below, that change is inconsistent with the 
fundamental principles of section 704(b ). Given the importance of 
this interaction between the proposed and section 704(b) 
regulations, it is surprising that the preamble to the proposed 
regulations does not discuss it. 
b. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(b)(ii) provides: 
(ii) Economic Effect.-( a) Fundamental principles.-In 
order for an allocation to have economic effect, it must be 
consistent with the underlying economic arrangement of 
the partners. That means that in the event there is an 
economic benefit or burden that corresponds to an 
allocation, the partner to whom the allocation is made 
must receive such economic benefit or bear such economic 
burden. [Emphasis added.] 
c. One of the ways that the section 704(b) regulations effectuate this 
fundamental principle is through a series of rules concerning 
partner nonrecourse debt. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(b)(4) defmes 
partner nonrecourse debt as "any partnership liability to the extent 
the liability is nonrecourse for purposes [of] section 1.1001-2, and 
a partner or related person (within the meaning of section 1.752-
4(b)) bears the economic risk ofloss under section 1.752-2 
because, for example, the partner or related person is the creditor 
or a guarantor." The section 704(b) regulations identify partner 
nonrecourse deductions that are attributable to partner nonrecourse 
debt and require those deductions to be allocated to the partner that 
bears the economic risk of loss for the liability. 43 The concept is 
that any economic burden corresponding to specified deductions 
(typically, depreciation deductions) will be borne by the partner 
that bears the economic risk of loss for the partner nonrecourse 
debt (for example, a partner that has guaranteed an otherwise 
nonrecourse debt). Accordingly, consistent with the fundamental 
43 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(i). 
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principles articulated above, those partner nomecourse deductions 
must be allocated to that partner. Example 22 illustrates these 
provisions under cunent law. 
d. Example 22 
i. A and B form AB partnership, each contributing $100,000. 
The AB pminership borrows $800,000 on a nomecourse 
basis, and A guarantees the debt. The partnership uses the 
$1 million to purchase depreciable property for which 
$100,000 of annual depreciation is allowable. The 
depreciable property secures the debt, and no principal 
payments on the debt are due for 10 years. The partnership 
agreement provides that all items are to be allocated 
equally to A and B. 
11. The $200,000 of depreciation deductions claimed in years 1 
and 2 are, in effect, attributable to the capital of A and B 
and may be allocated equally to them. If there were an 
economic burden conesponding to the $200,000 of 
depreciation deductions, the property would decline in 
value to $800,000. If the property were sold for $800,000, 
the proceeds would be sufficient only to repay the debt, and 
A and B would receive nothing. Thus, A and B would each 
bear $100,000 of the economic burden corresponding to the 
depreciation deductions, and the equal allocation of those 
depreciation deductions is valid. 
111. In year 3, however, the additional depreciation deductions 
of $100,000 constitute partner nomecourse deductions that 
must be allocated solely to A, notwithstanding the contrmy 
provision in the partnership agreement. If there were an 
economic burden corresponding to the additional $100,000 
of depreciation deductions, the property would decline in 
value to $700,000. If the property were sold for $700,000, 
the proceeds would be insufficient to repay the $800,000 
debt, and A would be required to pay $100,000 under its 
guarantee. Thus, as a result of the guarantee, A would bear 
the economic burden corresponding to the $100,000 of 
depreciation deductions in year 3, and only A may be 
allocated those deductions. A similar analysis would apply 
for depreciation deductions in future years. 
e. Because the proposed regulations would change the analysis 
regarding the extent to which a partner bears the economic risk of 
loss under Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2, they would effectively change 




regulations. Moreover, as illustrated by the following examples, 
those changes are inconsistent with the fundamental principle of 
section 704(b) that if there is an economic burden that conesponds 
to an allocation of deductions, the partner to whom the allocation is 
made must bear that economic burden. 
Example 23 
The facts are the same as in Example 22, except that the 
proposed regulations apply, and A does not receive mm's-
length consideration for providing the guarantee. 
Altematively, any of the other recognition requirements of 
Prop. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(b)(3)(ii) are not present. 
Because A does not bear the economic risk of loss for the 
debt under the proposed regulations, the debt is not a 
partner nomecourse debt within the meaning of Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.704-2(b)(4), but a nomecourse liability within the 
meaning ofTreas. Reg.§ 1.704-2(b)(3). Further, the year 3 
depreciation deductions are not pminer nomecourse 
deductions, but nomecourse deductions within the meaning 
ofTreas. Reg. § 1.704-2(c). As a result, the year 3 
depreciation deductions may be allocated equally between 
A and B. Indeed, under these facts, it is unlikely that the 
year 3 depreciation deductions could be allocated any other 
way. 44 
11. Even though the proposed regulations do not treat A as 
bearing the economic risk of loss for the liability, the 
economic reality is the same as in Example 22. If there 
were an economic burden conesponding to the $100,000 of 
year 3 depreciation deductions, the property would decline 
in value to $700,000. And if the property were then sold 
for $700,000, the proceeds would be insufficient to repay 
the $800,000 debt, and A would be required to pay 
$100,000 under the guarantee. Thus, as a result of the 
guarantee, A would bear the economic burden 
conesponding to the $100,000 of additional depreciation 
deductions in year 3. Nevertheless, the depreciation 
44 See Treas. Reg.§ 1.704-2. The analysis assumes that the minimum gain charge-back 
requirements ofTreas. Reg.§ 1.704-2 are met. Treas. Reg.§ 1.704-2(e)(2) generally requires 
that nomecourse deductions be allocated in a manner that is reasonably consistent with 
allocations that have substantial economic effect of some other significant partnership item 
attributable to the property securing the nomecourse liability. 
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deductions would be allocated equally between A and B, in 
violation of the fundamental principles of section 704(b ). 
g. Example 24 
h. 
1. Assume the same facts as in Example 22, except that A 
guarantees only the bottom $500,000 of the $800,000 
nonrecourse debt. Under the terms of the guarantee, A is 
required to pay only if the creditor receives less than 
$500,000 in proceeds after pursuing foreclosure or other 
appropriate creditor remedies. 
11. Under the cunent section 752 regulations, the $800,000 
liability is bifurcated and treated as a $300,000 nonrecourse 
liability and a $500,000 recourse liability for which A bears 
the economic risk of loss.45 Under the section 704(b) 
regulations, the $100,000 of depreciation deductions in 
each of years 3, 4 and 5 are nonrecourse deductions and 
may be allocated equally to A and B.46 However, 
additional depreciation deductions in year 6 and thereafter 
that reduce the basis of the property below the $500,000 
guaranteed pmtion of the liability are partner nonrecourse 
deductions and must be allocated solely to A.47 
iii. This result is consistent with the stated fundamental 
principles of section 704(b ). If there were an economic 
burden corresponding to the $100,000 of year 6 
depreciation deductions, the property would decline in 
value from $500,000 to $400,000. If the propeliy were 
sold for $400,000, the proceeds would be insufficient to 
repay the $800,000 debt, and A would be required to pay 
$100,000 under the bottom guarantee. 
lV. Thus, as a result of the guarantee, A would bear the 
economic burden conesponding to the $100,000 of 
depreciation deductions in year 6, and only A may be 
allocated those deductions. 
Example 25 
45 See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(i); and Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2. 
46 See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(d)(ii); and Treas. Reg.§ 1.704-2(m), Example 1(vii). 
47 Id. 
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48 See supra note 43. 
i. The facts are the same as in Example 24, except that the 
proposed regulations apply. A's bottom guarantee does not 
meet the requirements of prop. reg. section 1.752-
2(b)(3)(ii)(F) and thus is not recognized. Because A does 
not bear the economic risk of loss for the debt under the 
proposed regulations, the debt is not a partner nonrecourse 
debt within the meaning ofTreas. Reg. § 1.704-2(b)(4), but 
a nonrecourse liability within the meaning ofTreas. Reg.§ 
1.704-2(b)(3). Further, the year 6 depreciation deductions 
are not partner nonrecourse deductions, but nonrecourse 
deductions within the meaning ofTreas. Reg. § 1.704-2(c). 
As a result, the year 6 depreciation deductions may be 
allocated equally between A and B. Indeed, under these 
facts, it is unlikely that the year 6 depreciation deductions 
could be allocated any other way. 48 
n. Even though the proposed regulations do not treat A as 
bearing the economic risk of loss for the portion of the 
liability subject to the bottom guarantee, the economic 
reality is the same as in Example 11: If there were an 
economic burden conesponding to the $100,000 of year 6 
depreciation deductions, the property would decline in 
value to $400,000. And if the property were then sold for 
$400,000, the proceeds would be insufficient to repay the 
$800,000 debt, and A would be required to pay $100,000 
under the bottom guarantee. Thus, as a result of the bottom 
guarantee, A would bear the economic burden 
conesponding to the $100,000 of depreciation deductions 
in year 6. Nevertheless, the depreciation deductions would 
be allocated equally between A and B. 
1. Thus, the proposed regulations would allow or even require 
allocations that violate the fundamental principles of section 
704(b ). Moreover, they would allow or even require the very 
abuse that the section 704(b) regulations are intended to preclude-
namely, allocations of tax losses to a partner that will not bear any 
conesponding economic burden. As a result, the proposed 
regulations will encourage abusive trafficking in noneconomic tax 
losses. 
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5. Net Value Requirement Extended 
a. Under the current section 752 regulations, the determination of 
whether a partner or related party has an obligation to make a 
payment is based on the facts and circumstances at the time of the 
detennination.49 With the exception of disregarded entities, the 
current regulations provide that all partners and related persons 
that have payment obligations for a partnership liability are 
presumed to satisfy their obligations that become due and payable 
under the constructive liquidation test irrespective of their actual 
net worth unless the facts and circumstances indicate a plan to 
circumvent or avoid the obligation. 50 This presumption limits the 
extent to which a partnership is required to evaluate a partner's 
current or future ability to satisfy a payment obligation in 
determining how liabilities should be allocated, except in 
potentially abusive circumstances. 
b. Notwithstanding that presumption, the current regulations contain 
an antiabuse rule under which a partner's or related person's 
obligation to make a payment may be disregarded or treated as an 
obligation of another person for purposes of section 752. The 
antiabuse rule may apply if the facts and circumstances indicate 
that a principal purpose of the arrangement between the parties is 
to eliminate the partner's economic risk of loss for that obligation, 
or create the appearance of a partner or related person bearing the 
economic risk of loss when, in fact, the substance of the 
arrangement is otherwise. 51 Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(j) contains an 
example of a plan to circumvent or avoid an obligation, involving a 
thinly capitalized corporate partner that is a member of a 
consolidated return group and enters into a DRO to allow the 
group to enjoy tax losses while at the same time limiting its 
monetary exposure for those losses. The example concludes that 
the rules of section 752 must be applied as if the DRO did not 
exist. 
c. As noted above, Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(k) does impose a net worth 
requirement for a payment obligation of a disregarded entity. 52 
The regulations generally provide that such an obligation is taken 
49 Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(3). 
50 Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(b)(6). 
51 Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(j). 
52 Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(k). 
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into account only to the extent of the net value of the disregarded 
entity, which is measured on specified dates. Because the existence 
of a legal entity that is disregarded as separate from its owner 
limits the owner's liability for state law purposes, this rule is 
consistent with the underlying premise of the section 752 
regulations that a taxpayer should be treated as bearing the 
economic risk of loss for a partnership liability to the extent that it 
could be required to make a payment in the event that the 
partnership's assets become worthless. 
d. The proposed regulations expand the Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(k) net 
value requirement to apply to any partner, other than an individual 
or decedent's estate, that enters into an obligation for a partnership 
liability (other than a trade payable). Accordingly, to the extent 
that an obligation is taken into account after the application of the 
recognition requirements described above, the allocation of a 
partnership liability on account of the obligation entered into by 
the partner or related person will be limited to that obligor's net 
value. Also, the proposed regulations require that an obligor 
subject to the net value requirement timely give the partnership 
information about the obligor's net value that is appropriately 
allocable to the partnership's liabilities. 
e. We believe it is unnecessa1y to expand the net value requirement 
to every regarded entity obligor. A regarded business entity that 
enters into a payment obligation for a partnership liability is fully 
exposed to the extent of the entity's assets. Treasmy and the 
Service have not suggested that they are aware of taxpayers 
circumventing the current rules by structuring limited value entities 
that enter into payment obligations. In the only litigated case we 
know of involving a guarantee by an entity with limited value, the 
Service successfully argued that the guarantee should be 
disregarded under the existing antiabuse rule ofTreas. Reg.§ 
1.752-2(j).53 The expansion of that rule and the resulting 
information sharing and collection requirements will significantly 
increase the administrative burden on partners and partnerships in 
circumstances in which the requirements are unnecessary. 
Moreover, the extent of the information that must be provided to 
the partnership to establish an obligor's net value that is allocable 
to a partnership liability is unclear. Is a third-party appraisal 
required? Is an internal valuation sufficient? Will it suffice to 
53 Canal Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 199 (2010). 
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simply provide a statement to the partnership that the obligor has 
net worth that is at least equal to its payment obligation? 
f. The preamble to the proposed regulations states that Treasmy and 
the Service decided not to extend the net worth requirement to 
individuals because ofthe nature of personal guarantees.54 
Presumably, they were concerned that extending the net worth 
requirement to individuals would be burdensome and intmsive. 
We agree with that conclusion. We would note, however, that 
although individuals will not need to provide financial infmmation 
to their partnerships under the net value requirement, they are 
subject to all the recognition requirements of Prop. Treas. Reg. § 
1.752-2(b )(3) discussed above. Accordingly, individuals will need 
to provide financial information to lenders or their partnerships, or 
be subject to restrictions on dispositions of assets, in circumstances 
in which the lender or partnership may not have otherwise required 
the delivery of such infmmation. Further, if a regarded business 
entity owned by an individual enters into an obligation for a 
patinership liability that is supported by a capital contribution 
obligation of the individual, the entity may be required to deliver 
financial information about the individual owner of the entity in 
order to prove its net value that is allocable to the partnership 
liability. 
6. Effective Date and Transition Rule 
a. The changes to the partnership recourse liability mles will apply 
prospectively for liabilities incurred or assumed by a partnership, 
and for payment obligations imposed or undertaken, on or after the 
date the final regulations are published with the exception of 
liabilities incurred or assumed and payment obligations imposed or 
undertaken pursuant to a written binding contract. 55 Thus, in 
general, it appears that the proposed regulations would apply to 
any liability incurred after the effective date, even if that liability 
refinances a pre-effective-date liability that was subject to a 
guarantee. 
b. It is unclear how the prospective effective date would apply to a 
guarantee or other payment obligation for a term of years entered 
into before the date the final regulations are published that contains 
54 Preamble to REG-119305-11, at 21. 
55 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(1)(1). 
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an elective or automatic extension, subject to the right to terminate 
the obligation with sufficient notice and satisfaction of specified 
terms. Arguably, if those provisions are in a written binding 
contract, an extended payment obligation should continue to be 
subject to the existing section 752 regulations. Accordingly, 
although the precise scope of this rule is unclear, it may allow 
some existing guarantees for a term of years that may be extended 
under debt maintenance agreements to be grandfathered if they are 
not altered after the date the final regulations are published. 
However, if a guarantee is amended on or after that date, the 
guarantee would likely be treated as a new obligation subject to the 
new section 752 regulations. The application of the effective date 
rules is explored in the following examples. 
c. Example 26 
1. Before the effective date of the proposed regulations, a 
partnership enters into a nonrecourse loan from Bank X 
with a 10-year term. To maintain A's allocable share of the 
liability to avoid gain recognition as a result of a deemed 
distribution under section 752(b) in excess of A's basis in 
the partnership interest, A enters into a full guarantee of the 
liability. 
11. A's guarantee provides that it has an initial term of three 
years and is thereafter automatically extended for 
successive one-year terms unless A provides six-months 
prior written notice to Bank X, and the partnership satisfies 
specified financial requirements. Assume the proposed 
regulations become effective on the second anniversary of 
the partnership incurring the Banlc X debt. Presumably, 
A's guarantee would be grandfathered for the balance of 
the initial term because the liability was incurred, and A's 
payment obligation was imposed or undertaken, pursuant to 
a written binding contract entered into before the date the 
proposed regulations became effective. 
111. Would the automatic one-year extensions of A's guarantee 
also be grandfathered? Arguably, they should be because 
they were imposed or undertaken pursuant to a written 
binding contract entered into before the effective date of 
the proposed regulations. 
d. Example 27 
1. The facts are the same as in Example 26, except that the 
partnership and A also enter into a debt maintenance 
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agreement that obligates the partnership to maintain a 
specified level of debt that must be guaranteed by A for a 
10-year period. A's guarantee of the Bank X liability is for 
the fulllO-year te1m. Assume the proposed regulations 
become effective on the second anniversmy of the 
partnership incurring the Banlc X liability. On the third 
anniversmy, the partnership refinances the Banlc X liability 
with a loan from Bank Y. Under the debt maintenance 
agreement, A is required to enter into a guarantee of the 
Bank Y liability. 
11. Is A's guarantee of the Bank Y liability grandfathered 
under the current section 752 regulations because both the 
Banlc Y liability and the guarantee were undertaken 
pursuant to the debt maintenance agreement, which is a 
written binding contract entered into before the date the 
proposed regulations became effective? 
e. Example 28 
1. The facts are the same as in Example 27, except that A has 
the right, but not the obligation, to guarantee the 
partnership's debt for a 10-year period under the debt 
maintenance agreement. If A enters into a guarantee of the 
Bank Y liability one year after the proposed regulations 
become effective, is A grandfathered under the existing 
section 752 regulations because the guarantee was 
undertaken pursuant to a written binding contract entered 
into before the date the proposed regulations became 
effective? 
f. To ease their potential effect when they become effective, the 
proposed regulations provide for a seven-year transition period. 
During that period, if a partner (the transition partner) has a share 
of recourse liabilities under existing Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(b), the 
partnership may choose not to apply the new partnership recourse 
debt allocation mles to an amount of partnership liabilities equal to 
the excess of the transition partner's share of recourse liabilities 
over its adjusted basis in the partnership interest. The amount of 
partnership liabilities to which the transition mle applies is reduced 
to the extent that the built-in gain attributable to the transition 
partner's negative tax basis capital account is recognized. Further, 
if the transition partner is a partnership, S corporation, or 
disregarded entity, a 50 percent or greater change in ownership of 
the transition partner will terminate the transition period. Because 
the seven-year transition mle applies only if elected by the 
partnership, partners that have entered into or will enter into 
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guarantees and similar obligations for partnership liabilities should 
take steps now to require that the partnership make that election if 
the proposed regulations become effective, and the partner so 
requests. As illustrated in Example 16, some taxpayers may find 
that the seven-year transition period is not long enough. 
g. Example 28 
1. Before the effective date of the proposed regulations, A 
contributed property to a partnership subject to debt in 
excess ofbasis. To obtain an enhanced share of partnership 
liabilities and avoid gain recognition as a result of a 
deemed distribution under section 752(b) in excess of A's 
basis in the partnership interest, A enters into a guarantee 
or DRO. The partnership and A also enter into a lockout 
agreement that generally provides that the partnership will 
not sell the contributed property (which would trigger A's 
gain under section 704(c)) for a specified period. Also, to 
further protect A's tax deferral, the lockout agreement 
contains debt maintenance provisions that obligate the 
pminership during the same period to maintain a specified 
level of debt that may be guaranteed by A. 
ii. As discussed above, it is unclear whether that arrangement 
would be grandfathered under the binding contract 
exception of Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(1)(1). If the 
specified period extends beyond the seven-year transition 
period, A will be denied the benefit of its bargain because 
of a change in the regulations that is not truly prospective 
only. We are familiar with many real-world cases in which 
the specified period exceeds seven years, including those in 
which A is an individual, and the period ends only on A's 
death (at which time the tax liability is absolved by viltue 
of the step-up in basis at death). 
h. Other taxpayers may fmd that the seven-year transition rule is 
inadequate because it limits relief to an amount equal to the excess 
of the taxpayer's share of recourse liabilities over basis in the 
partnership interest immediately before the proposed regulations 
become effective. 
1. Example 29 
1. The facts are the same as in Example 28, except that the 
contributed property is depreciable, and A enters into the 
guarantee not because A needs an enhanced share of the 
liabilities at the time of contribution, but because A 
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anticipates needing an enhanced share in the future. This 
often occurs with contributions of depreciable property 
subject to nonrecourse debt because of the phenomenon 
known as "section 704(c) bum-off." Section 704(c) bum-
off refers to the fact that the amount of section 704( c) gain 
on depreciable property contributed to a partnership 
declines annually as depreciation deductions are claimed. 56 
ii. As discussed above, as the section 704( c) gain declines 
annually, so does the amount of nonrecourse debt allocated 
to the contributing partner under the second tier of Treas. 
Reg.§ 1-752-3(a)(2). 
iii. In the context of the seven-year transition rule, the point is 
that if A has a sufficient share of nonrecourse liabilities to 
avoid gain recognition immediately before the effective 
date of the proposed regulations but, nevertheless, has 
guaranteed debt to prevent gain recognition in the future 
from an anticipated reduction of nonrecourse liabilities, 
seven-year transition relief will be unavailable for the 
guaranteed liability. 57 
J. Still other taxpayers may find that the rule terminating seven-year 
transition relief when there is a change in ownership to a transition 
partner that is a partnership causes them to lose relief as a result of 
events they cannot control. 
k. Example 30 
i. A is a 49 percent partner, and B is a 51 percent partner, in 
an upper-tier partnership (UTP). UTP is a 30 percent 
partner in a lower-tier partnership (LTP). To maintain an 
enhanced share of L TP liabilities, UTP has entered into a 
guarantee of specified LTP liabilities. Further, A and B 
56 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(3)(9)(ii). See generally Blake D. Rubin and Andrea M. Whiteway, 
"Making Section 704( c) Sing for You," 66 NY. U Federal Tax Institute ch. 9 (2008). 
57 To illustrate, immediately before the effective date of the proposed regulations, A might have 
a negative $100 tax basis capital account, $100 share of nonrecourse liabilities, and $20 share of 
recourse liabilities on account of a guarantee entered into to prevent future gain recognition, as 
A's section 704( c) gain bums off and A's share of nonrecourse liabilities declines. A's tax basis 
in the interest would be $20, and the seven-year transition rule would be inapplicable because 
A's $20 share of recourse liabilities does not exceed the basis in its interest. Relief might be 
available initially under the general effective date rule of Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(1)(1) but 
would be lost if the debt subject to the guarantee were refinanced. 
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have entered into a capital contribution obligation requiring 
that ifUTP must pay on its guarantee, A will contribute 49 
percent, and B will contribute 51 percent of the required 
funds to UTP. B sells its interest to C, which also assumes 
B's capital contribution obligation. 
n. Under Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(l)(B)(ii), A loses the 
benefit of the seven-year transition rule and recognizes gain 
on account of a deemed distribution under section 7 52(b) 
that exceeds the basis in A's interest. 58 Thus, A loses the 
benefit of the seven-year transition rule even though its 
payment obligation is unchanged, there is no change in the 
partnership liability, and it has no control over B 's sale. 
The policy justification for this seems particularly opaque, 
even under a set of proposed regulations whose policy 
justification is obscure at best. 
E. NONRECOURSE LIABILITIES - CURRENT RULES 
1. As discussed above, a partnership liability is a nonrecourse liability if no 
patiner or related person bears the economic risk of loss for that liability. 
Under Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-3(a), a partner's share of partnership 
nonrecourse liabilities equals the sum of three tiers of allocations. First, a 
patiner is allocated an amount of a partnership's nonrecourse liabilities 
equal to the amount of that partner's share of partnership minimum gain 
determined under section 704(b).59 The partnership minimum gain is 
generally the excess of the amount of a nonrecourse liability over the 
section 704(b) book value of the property securing the liability. 
2. Second, a partner is allocated an amount of a partnership's nonrecourse 
liabilities equal to the amount of any taxable gain that would be allocated 
to the pa1iner under section 704( c) (or in the same manner as under section 
704( c) if partnership property is revalued), if the partnership disposed of 
all patinership property subject to nonrecourse liabilities for no 
58 Even if the anangement might otherwise be grandfathered under the general effective date rule 
of Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(1)(1), it appears that that status would be lost as a result of the 
technical termination ofUTP that would occur under section 708(b)(l)(B). New UTP would not 
have incuned any liability or payment obligation prior to the effective date. The relief for 
technical terminations provided by the general effective date rule of Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-
2(1)(2)(B) applies only for purposes of the seven-year transition rule. 
59 Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-3(a)(l). 
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consideration other than full satisfaction of the liabilities.60 The second 
tier amount is often referred to as "section 704(c) minimum gain." 
3. Finally, a partner's share of the amount of nonrecourse liabilities that is 
not allocated to partners under the first or second tiers (excess nonrecourse 
liabilities) is determined in accordance with the partner's share of 
partnership profits. The partner's interest in partnership profits is 
determined by taking into account all facts and circumstances regarding 
the partners' economic arrangement. 61 
4. The current regulations provide that the partnership agreement may 
specify the partner's interest in partnership profits for purposes of 
allocating excess nonrecourse liabilities so long as the specified interest is 
reasonably consistent with allocations (that have substantial economic 
effect under the section 704(b) regulations) of some significant item of 
partnership income or gain (significant item method). Alternatively, the 
current regulations provide that excess nonrecourse liabilities may be 
allocated among the partners in accordance with the manner in which it is 
reasonably expected that the deductions attributable to those nonrecourse 
liabilities will be allocated (alternative method). Also, the partnership 
may first allocate excess nonrecourse liabilities to a partner up to the 
amount ofbuilt-in gain that is allocable to the partner on section 704(c) 
property or property for which reverse section 704( c) allocations are 
applicable by virtue of a book-up (as described in Treas. Reg. § 1.704-
3(a)(6)(i)) where such property is subject to the nonrecourse liability to the 
extent that such built-in gain exceeds the amount of gain taken into 
account under the second tier for that property (excess section 704( c) 
method).62 
F. PROPOSED NONRECOURSE LIABILITY REGULATIONS 
1. While the proposed regulations retain the excess section 704( c) method for 
allocating excess nonrecourse liabilities, the significant item and 
alternative methods would both be eliminated. Instead, the proposed 
regulations would allow a partnership to allocate excess nonrecourse 
liabilities based on the partners' liquidation value percentages. 63 A 
partner's liquidation value percentage is the ratio (expressed as a 
percentage) of the liquidation value of the partner's interest in the 
60 Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3(a)(2). 
61 Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3(a)(3). 
62 Id. 
63 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3(a)(3). 
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partnership to the aggregate liquidation value of all the partners' interests 
in the partnership. A partner's liquidation value percentage must be 
determined upon fmmation of the partnership and is required to be 
redete1mined whenever a revaluation event occurs, as set fmth in Treas. 
Reg.§ 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f)(5) (such as a dispropmtionate capital 
contribution or distribution), regardless of whether the partnership 
revalues its assets. The liquidation value of a partner's interest in a 
partnership is the amount of cash the partner would receive with respect to 
the interest if, immediately after the formation of the partnership or the 
occunence of a section 704(b) revaluation event, the partnership sold all 
its assets for a cash amount equal to the fair market value of those assets 
(taking into account section 7701(g)); satisfied all its liabilities (other than 
those described in Treas. Reg. § 1.752-7); paid an unrelated third patty to 
assume all of its Treas. Reg. § 1. 7 52-7 liabilities in a fully taxable 
transaction; and then liquidated.64 A pmtner's liquidation value 
percentage is thus equal to the partner's interest in partnership capital. 65 
2. Like the proposed regulations on partnership recourse liabilities, the 
proposed changes to the pmtnership nonrecourse liability regulations 
would apply to liabilities incurred or assumed by a pa1tnership on or after 
the date the proposed regulations are published as fmal regulations. 
G. NONRECOURSE LIABILITIES- COMMENTARY 
1. The preamble states that the Service and Treasury believe that the 
significant item and alternative methods may not properly reflect a 
partner's share of partnership profits that are generally used to repay 
nonrecourse liabilities because the allocation of the significant item may 
not necessarily reflect the overall economic anangement of the pmtners. 
If the interest in partnership profits is to be the touchstone for allocating 
nonrecourse liabilities (as it has been since 1956), it seems that allocating 
partnership nonrecourse liabilities in accordance with the partners' 
liquidation value percentages fails to reflect that approach. Except for a 
simple pmtnership in which each partner's share of profits and losses 
conesponds to that partner's percentage share of capital contributions, the 
partners' liquidation value percentages will not conespond to their share 
of profits or losses. Consequently, valid allocations of losses to partners 
under the section 704(b) regulations may be subject to the section 704( d) 
basis limitation, as shown in Example 19. 
64 !d. The liquidation value used to determine a partner's liquidation value percentage is similar 
to that for the determination of the liquidation value of a profits interest pa1tner under Rev. Proc. 
93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343. 
65 See Rev. Proc. 93-27; and Treas. Reg.§ 1.704-1(e)(1)(v). 
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2. Example 31 
66 1993-2 C.B. 343. 
a. A and Beach make $1,000 capital contributions to AB Partnership, 
and each has a 50 percent share of AB Partnership's profits, losses 
and distributions. AB Partnership borrows $9,000 from Bank on a 
nonrecourse basis and acquires property with a value of$11,000. 
Following the formation of the AB Partnership and at a time when 
the value of the partnership's property is still $11,000, Cis 
admitted to the AB Partnership for a profits interest in exchange 
for services provided by C to or for the benefit of the AB 
Partnership. The Erofits interest complies with the safe harbor in 
Rev. Proc. 93-27. 6 The AB Partnership agreement is amended to 
provide that operating distributions will be made first to A and B 
until they have received an 8 percent cumulative compounded 
retum on each of their unretumed capital contributions, and 
thereafter 33 percent to each of A, B, and C. Distributions from 
capital events will be made first to A and B pro rata until their 
unretumed capital contributions are reduced to zero; second to A 
and B until they have received an 8 percent cumulative 
compounded retum on each of their unretumed capital 
contributions; and thereafter 33 percent to each of A, B, and C. 
Upon liquidation of the AB Partnership, distributions to the 
partners are to be made in accordance with partners' positive 
capital accounts. C enters into a DRO so it may be allocated a 33 
percent share of losses in accordance with the section 704(b) 
regulations. 67 
b. Taking into account A's and B's right to a preferred retum on their 
unretumed capital contributions, it is unclear what C's share of the 
AB Partnership's profits is when allocating the partnership's 
nonrecourse liabilities under Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3(a)(3) according 
to the general facts and circumstances test. Under the existing 
regulations, the AB Partnership could apply the significant item 
method and allocate 33 percent of the $9,000 liability to C based 
on the residual distribution of the AB Partnership's profits in 
accordance with the partners' percentage interests, which would 
increase C's basis to $3,000 under section 752(a). As a result, C 
would be able to deduct losses allocated to it under the section 
704(b) regulations and would not be prohibited from deducting 
those losses under section 704( d). However, in applying the 
67 Treas. Reg.§ 1.704-l(b)(2)(ii)(b)(3). 
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liquidation value percentage method in the proposed regulations, 
because C's liquidation value percentage would be zero, C would 
not be allocated any of the $9,000 liability. Accordingly, under the 
liquidation value percentage safe harbor, until a revaluation event 
occurs, and C's liquidation value percentage is recomputed, C 
would be unable to deduct any losses validly allocated to it under 
the section 704(b) regulations because it would be subject to the 
section 704( d) basis limitation. 
3. Similarly, partnership nomecourse deductions may be validly allocated 
among partners in a manner that is inconsistent with the partners' 
liquidation value percentages under section 704(b ). The inability to 
allocate nomecourse debt under the altemative method will result in 
unnecessary shifts in the allocation of nomecourse debt among partners. 
This is because the nomecourse debt allocated under Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-
3(a)(3) in accordance with the partners' liquidation value percentages 
becomes subject to Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3(a)(l) and is allocated in 
accordance with the partners' shares of partnership minimum gain. 
Among other things, that shift in a partner's share ofnomecourse debt 
may have adverse consequences under section 7 51 (b). 68 
4. The proposed regulations also would impose an additional burden on 
partnerships: They must revalue their assets to determine the partners' 
liquidation value percentages even if the partnership would not otherwise 
elect to revalue its assets. 
5. Fundamentally, the proposed regulations would limit flexibility in the 
allocation of excess nomecourse liabilities based on an unpersuasive 
rationale. The cmrent section 752 regulations intentionally allocate or 
allow for the allocation of partnership nomecourse debt to partners to 
prevent the recognition of built-in gain by partners and allow them to 
recognize losses allocated under section 704(b ). 69 The statement in the 
68 See Rev. Rul. 84-102, 1984-2 C.B. 119. 
69 The current regulations generally ensure that upon a contribution of property to a partnership, 
the contributing partner is allocated an amount ofnomecourse debt under Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-
3(a)(2) that is at least equal to the amount ofnomecourse debt in excess of the partner's tax basis 
in the contributed property. After their initial issuance, the regulations were amended to further 
minimize the likelihood of a deemed distribution under section 752(b) in excess of a partner's 
basis in a partnership. The regulations were modified in 2000 to give a partnership the flexibility 
to allocate debt secured by multiple properties among those properties in a manner that 
maximizes the allocation of that nomecourse debt back to the contributing partner. See T.D. 
8906. Also, as noted above, the regulations were amended to allow a partnership to allocate 
excess nomecourse debt under the excess section 704( c) method to the extent of any section 
704(c) gain unaccounted for under Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-3(a)(2). Id 
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preamble that the Service and Treasury believe that the significant item 
and alternative methods "may not properly reflect a partner's share of 
partnership profits" seems particularly unconvincing given that the 
liquidation value percentage safe harbor in the proposed regulations does 
not reflect the partner's interest in profits at all, but reflects the partner's 
interest in capital. 
6. One of the primaty motivations for changing the way in which partnership 
excess nomecourse liabilities are allocated under Prop. Treas. Reg. § 
1.752-3(a)(3) may have been to limit the ability to stmcture a leveraged 
partnership transaction with nomecourse debt when the significant item 
method is used to allocate the entire amount allocable under that section to 
the distributee-partner in accordance with a preferred return allocation. 
The Service has attacked that stmcture in LTR 200436001 and ILM 
200513022. If the goal was to prevent that stmcture, it could be achieved 
by simply changing the manner in which the allocation of partnership 
nomecourse debt is taken into account for purposes of the debt-financed 
distribution exception to the disguised sale mles. That approach was 
already taken to exclude allocations of partnership debt under Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.752-3(a)(l) or (2) or the excess section 704(c) method from being 
taken into account for purposes of the debt-financed distribution 
exception.70 The approach would specifically target the Service's and 
Treasury's concerns while preserving the intended flexibility in the 
allocation of partnership nomecourse debt. 
H. CONCLUSION 
1. If finalized, the amendments to the partnership debt allocation mles in the 
proposed regulations would be among the most significant changes in 
partnership tax law in more than 20 years. In many cases, they would 
result in the recognition of taxable gain by partners or limit partners' 
ability to take losses into account as a result of a reduction in their 
allocable share of partnership liabilities. 
2. In contrast to the existing regulations on the allocation of partnership 
recourse liabilities, which are largely mechanical and administrable, the 
proposed regulations would impose unclear, subjective, and in some cases, 
noncommercial requirements on payment obligations commonly entered 
into by partners in order for those obligations to be taken into account 
under section 752. The proposed regulations are inconsistent with both 
Congress's directive as stated in the legislative history ofDEFRA and the 
stmcture and policy of the section 704(b) regulations. Moreover, the 
70 Treas. Reg. § 1.707-5(a)(2)(ii); Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3(a)(3). 
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proposed regulations on nonrecourse liabilities unnecessarily limit the 
intended flexibility of the cutTent regulations. 
3. The American Law Institute, in its 1984 detailed analysis and proposals 
conceming subchapter K, noted that "once it is decided to apply relatively 
strict rules to profit-and-loss allocations ... there seem to be no important 
policies served by a strict rule for allocating liabilities among partners in 
computing their basis for their patinership interests. This is particularly 
true when there appears to be more than one justifiable allocation with no 
single one being clearly cotTect."71 The section 704(b) regulations provide 
strict rules for allocating profits and losses, and the proposed regulations 
serve no impmiant policy apart from their indirect attack on leveraged 
partnerships. 
4. We suggest that the proposed regulations under section 752 be withdrawn. 
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If the Service and Treasury believe changes to the patinership debt 
allocation rules are necessmy to target specific concems with partnership 
disguised sale structures, the agencies should propose changes in the 
section 707 regulations rather than imposing an unworkable regime on 
every partnership and pminership liability. 
71 ALI report, supra note 5, at 270. 
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